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#### Anti-trust reform is based in free market logics of upholding competition which strengthens free enterprise and saves capitalism.

Parakkal & Bartz-Marvez 13, Raju Parakkal: Assistant Professor of International Relations, Philadelphia University. Sherry Bartz-Marvez: Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami (Capitalism, democratic capitalism, and the pursuit of antitrust laws, *The Antitrust Bulletin*, Vol. 58, No. 4, Winter 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800409)

Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies.

Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1

In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4

While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### Pandemics are inevitable and accelerating beneath capitalism---it creates breeding grounds for pathogenic spread and undermines global preparedness.

Attard 20, Socialist Appeal activist and writer for Marxist.com, (Joe, March 24th, 2020, “Pandemics, profiteering and big pharma: how capitalism plagues public health”, https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm)

“Outbreaks are inevitable, pandemics are optional”

In 1994, Pulitzer-winning journalist Laurie Garrett wrote The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. This was followed in 2001 by Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health. Over these two books, she explained that “human disruption of the global environment, coupled with behaviors that readily spread microbes between people and from animals to humans, guaranteed a global surge in epidemics, even an enormous pandemic. [These] outbreaks were aided and abetted by inept health systems, human behavior, and the complete lack of consistent political and financial support for disease-fighting preparedness everywhere in the world.”[[74]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn74) Though she didn’t put it in these terms, these books were a damning indictment of capitalism and its corrosive effects on public health. Garrett’s warnings were corroborated in a 2018 report by the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which warned that “there is a very real threat of a rapidly moving, highly lethal pandemic of a respiratory pathogen killing 50 to 80 million people and wiping out nearly 5% of the world’s economy”.[[75]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn75)

The report continues:

“Between 2011 and 2018, WHO tracked 1,483 epidemic events in 172 countries. Epidemic-prone diseases such as influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), Ebola, Zika, plague, yellow fever and others, are harbingers of a new era of high-impact, potentially fast-spreading outbreaks that are more frequently detected and increasingly difficult to manage… Any country without basic primary health care, public health services, health infrastructure and effective infection control mechanisms faces the greatest losses, including death, displacement and economic devastation.”[[76]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn76)

In other words, the current COVID-19 crisis is part of a new era in which pandemics will become more common, for the reasons I have described. The world is underprepared for this, and the poorest countries are going to suffer the most. Aside from the emergence of new pathogens, there are other threats on the horizon, including antibiotic-resistant strains of microbes like streptococcus and staphylococcus, cultivated in hospitals in the advanced capitalist countries, due to an over-reliance on antibiotics developed in the post-war period.[[77]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn77) Illnesses of the 19th and 20th century, like TB, are returning with a vengeance in poor communities like Harlem in New York City – and developing antibiotic resistance.[[78]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn78) In the 1990s, a forecast by the University of California predicted that by 2070 the world would have exhausted all antimicrobial drug options, as viruses, bacteria, parasites and fungi would have evolved complete resistance to the human pharmaceutical arsenal.[[79]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn79) This apocalyptic scenario could be avoided, if more was invested in R&D for vaccines and alternative treatments. But as explained, this is not a profitable avenue for big pharma.

Responding to the aforementioned GPMB report, Garrett was sceptical that any of its proposals (which amount to lobbying governments and private enterprise to cooperate more effectively on funding and research) would amount to anything. She wrote: “With no intention of degrading the GPMB’s effort, I must sadly say that this core message has been shouted from the rafters many times before, with little discernible impact on tone-deaf political leaders, financial enterprises, or multinational institutions. There’s no reason to think this time will be any different.”[[80]](https://www.marxist.com/pandemics-profiteering-and-big-pharma-how-capitalism-plagues-public-health.htm" \l "_ftn80)

Indeed, on a capitalist basis, it is unlikely that the situation will improve. These diseases have been conjured up by the system itself, and the living patterns of modern capitalist societies create ideal conditions for them to spread. Urbanisation has concentrated the vast majority of the planet’s 8bn people into dense populations, where disease can run rampant. And the dramatic increase in worldwide movement of people and goods (facilitated by modern transport, and exacerbated by war and climate change) creates viable channels for microbes to rage across the planet. It only took a matter of days before COVID-19 had spread from one end of the earth to the other. Such a global problem requires an international solution. But, as described, antagonism between different capitalist nations, the private property rights of the major pharmaceutical companies and the profit-based mode of production prevents the kind of coordinated response necessary to fight pandemics.

#### Capitalism causes existential climate change, nuclear war, democratic collapse, extreme inequality, and perpetual exploitation of the global south — try or die for a transition.

Foster 19, Sociology Professor @ Oregon (John Bellamy, February 1st, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?” *The Monthly Review*, Volume 70, Issue 9, <https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/>, Accessed 06-30-2021)

Less than two decades into the twenty-first century, it is evident that capitalism has failed as a social system. The world is mired in economic stagnation, financialization, and the most extreme inequality in human history, accompanied by mass unemployment and underemployment, precariousness, poverty, hunger, wasted output and lives, and what at this point can only be called a planetary ecological “death spiral.”1 The digital revolution, the greatest technological advance of our time, has rapidly mutated from a promise of free communication and liberated production into new means of surveillance, control, and displacement of the working population. The institutions of liberal democracy are at the point of collapse, while fascism, the rear guard of the capitalist system, is again on the march, along with patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and war.

To say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent.2 It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century. Today, more than ever, the world is faced with the epochal choice between “the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large and the common ruin of the contending classes.”3

Indications of this failure of capitalism are everywhere. Stagnation of investment punctuated by bubbles of financial expansion, which then inevitably burst, now characterizes the so-called free market.4 Soaring inequality in income and wealth has its counterpart in the declining material circumstances of a majority of the population. Real wages for most workers in the United States have barely budged in forty years despite steadily rising productivity.5 Work intensity has increased, while work and safety protections on the job have been systematically jettisoned. Unemployment data has become more and more meaningless due to a new institutionalized underemployment in the form of contract labor in the gig economy.6 Unions have been reduced to mere shadows of their former glory as capitalism has asserted totalitarian control over workplaces. With the demise of Soviet-type societies, social democracy in Europe has perished in the new atmosphere of “liberated capitalism.”7

The capture of the surplus value produced by overexploited populations in the poorest regions of the world, via the global labor arbitrage instituted by multinational corporations, is leading to an unprecedented amassing of financial wealth at the center of the world economy and relative poverty in the periphery.8 Around $21 trillion of offshore funds are currently lodged in tax havens on islands mostly in the Caribbean, constituting “the fortified refuge of Big Finance.”9 Technologically driven monopolies resulting from the global-communications revolution, together with the rise to dominance of Wall Street-based financial capital geared to speculative asset creation, have further contributed to the riches of today’s “1 percent.” Forty-two billionaires now enjoy as much wealth as half the world’s population, while the three richest men in the United States—Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett—have more wealth than half the U.S. population.10 In every region of the world, inequality has increased sharply in recent decades.11 The gap in per capita income and wealth between the richest and poorest nations, which has been the dominant trend for centuries, is rapidly widening once again.12 More than 60 percent of the world’s employed population, some two billion people, now work in the impoverished informal sector, forming a massive global proletariat. The global reserve army of labor is some 70 percent larger than the active labor army of formally employed workers.13

Adequate health care, housing, education, and clean water and air are increasingly out of reach for large sections of the population, even in wealthy countries in North America and Europe, while transportation is becoming more difficult in the United States and many other countries due to irrationally high levels of dependency on the automobile and disinvestment in public transportation. Urban structures are more and more characterized by gentrification and segregation, with cities becoming the playthings of the well-to-do while marginalized populations are shunted aside. About half a million people, most of them children, are homeless on any given night in the United States.14 New York City is experiencing a major rat infestation, attributed to warming temperatures, mirroring trends around the world.15

In the United States and other high-income countries, life expectancy is in decline, with a remarkable resurgence of Victorian illnesses related to poverty and exploitation. In Britain, gout, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and even scurvy are now resurgent, along with tuberculosis. With inadequate enforcement of work health and safety regulations, black lung disease has returned with a vengeance in U.S. coal country.16 Overuse of antibiotics, particularly by capitalist agribusiness, is leading to an antibiotic-resistance crisis, with the dangerous growth of superbugs generating increasing numbers of deaths, which by mid–century could surpass annual cancer deaths, prompting the World Health Organization to declare a “global health emergency.”17 These dire conditions, arising from the workings of the system, are consistent with what Frederick Engels, in the Condition of the Working Class in England, called “social murder.”18

At the instigation of giant corporations, philanthrocapitalist foundations, and neoliberal governments, public education has been restructured around corporate-designed testing based on the implementation of robotic common-core standards. This is generating massive databases on the student population, much of which are now being surreptitiously marketed and sold.19 The corporatization and privatization of education is feeding the progressive subordination of children’s needs to the cash nexus of the commodity market. We are thus seeing a dramatic return of Thomas Gradgrind’s and Mr. M’Choakumchild’s crass utilitarian philosophy dramatized in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times: “Facts are alone wanted in life” and “You are never to fancy.”20 Having been reduced to intellectual dungeons, many of the poorest, most racially segregated schools in the United States are mere pipelines for prisons or the military.21

More than two million people in the United States are behind bars, a higher rate of incarceration than any other country in the world, constituting a new Jim Crow. The total population in prison is nearly equal to the number of people in Houston, Texas, the fourth largest U.S. city. African Americans and Latinos make up 56 percent of those incarcerated, while constituting only about 32 percent of the U.S. population. Nearly 50 percent of American adults, and a much higher percentage among African Americans and Native Americans, have an immediate family member who has spent or is currently spending time behind bars. Both black men and Native American men in the United States are nearly three times, Hispanic men nearly two times, more likely to die of police shootings than white men.22 Racial divides are now widening across the entire planet.

Violence against women and the expropriation of their unpaid labor, as well as the higher level of exploitation of their paid labor, are integral to the way in which power is organized in capitalist society—and how it seeks to divide rather than unify the population. More than a third of women worldwide have experienced physical/sexual violence. Women’s bodies, in particular, are objectified, reified, and commodified as part of the normal workings of monopoly-capitalist marketing.23

The mass media-propaganda system, part of the larger corporate matrix, is now merging into a social media-based propaganda system that is more porous and seemingly anarchic, but more universal and more than ever favoring money and power. Utilizing modern marketing and surveillance techniques, which now dominate all digital interactions, vested interests are able to tailor their messages, largely unchecked, to individuals and their social networks, creating concerns about “fake news” on all sides.24 Numerous business entities promising technological manipulation of voters in countries across the world have now surfaced, auctioning off their services to the highest bidders.25 The elimination of net neutrality in the United States means further concentration, centralization, and control over the entire Internet by monopolistic service providers.

Elections are increasingly prey to unregulated “dark money” emanating from the coffers of corporations and the billionaire class. Although presenting itself as the world’s leading democracy, the United States, as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy stated in Monopoly Capital in 1966, “is democratic in form and plutocratic in content.”26 In the Trump administration, following a long-established tradition, 72 percent of those appointed to the cabinet have come from the higher corporate echelons, while others have been drawn from the military.27

War, engineered by the United States and other major powers at the apex of the system, has become perpetual in strategic oil regions such as the Middle East, and threatens to escalate into a global thermonuclear exchange. During the Obama administration, the United States was engaged in wars/bombings in seven different countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan.28 Torture and assassinations have been reinstituted by Washington as acceptable instruments of war against those now innumerable individuals, group networks, and whole societies that are branded as terrorist. A new Cold War and nuclear arms race is in the making between the United States and Russia, while Washington is seeking to place road blocks to the continued rise of China. The Trump administration has created a new space force as a separate branch of the military in an attempt to ensure U.S. dominance in the militarization of space. Sounding the alarm on the increasing dangers of a nuclear war and of climate destabilization, the distinguished Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved its doomsday clock in 2018 to two minutes to midnight, the closest since 1953, when it marked the advent of thermonuclear weapons.29

Increasingly severe economic sanctions are being imposed by the United States on countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua, despite their democratic elections—or because of them. Trade and currency wars are being actively promoted by core states, while racist barriers against immigration continue to be erected in Europe and the United States as some 60 million refugees and internally displaced peoples flee devastated environments. Migrant populations worldwide have risen to 250 million, with those residing in high-income countries constituting more than 14 percent of the populations of those countries, up from less than 10 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, ruling circles and wealthy countries seek to wall off islands of power and privilege from the mass of humanity, who are to be left to their fate.30

More than three-quarters of a billion people, over 10 percent of the world population, are chronically malnourished.31 Food stress in the United States keeps climbing, leading to the rapid growth of cheap dollar stores selling poor quality and toxic food. Around forty million Americans, representing one out of eight households, including nearly thirteen million children, are food insecure.32 Subsistence farmers are being pushed off their lands by agribusiness, private capital, and sovereign wealth funds in a global depeasantization process that constitutes the greatest movement of people in history.33 Urban overcrowding and poverty across much of the globe is so severe that one can now reasonably refer to a “planet of slums.”34 Meanwhile, the world housing market is estimated to be worth up to $163 trillion (as compared to the value of gold mined over all recorded history, estimated at $7.5 trillion).35

The Anthropocene epoch, first ushered in by the Great Acceleration of the world economy immediately after the Second World War, has generated enormous rifts in planetary boundaries, extending from climate change to ocean acidification, to the sixth extinction, to disruption of the global nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, to the loss of freshwater, to the disappearance of forests, to widespread toxic-chemical and radioactive pollution.36 It is now estimated that 60 percent of the world’s wildlife vertebrate population (including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and fish) have been wiped out since 1970, while the worldwide abundance of invertebrates has declined by 45 percent in recent decades.37 What climatologist James Hansen calls the “species exterminations” resulting from accelerating climate change and rapidly shifting climate zones are only compounding this general process of biodiversity loss. Biologists expect that half of all species will be facing extinction by the end of the century.38

If present climate-change trends continue, the “global carbon budget” associated with a 2°C increase in average global temperature will be broken in sixteen years (while a 1.5°C increase in global average temperature—staying beneath which is the key to long-term stabilization of the climate—will be reached in a decade). Earth System scientists warn that the world is now perilously close to a Hothouse Earth, in which catastrophic climate change will be locked in and irreversible.39 The ecological, social, and economic costs to humanity of continuing to increase carbon emissions by 2.0 percent a year as in recent decades (rising in 2018 by 2.7 percent—3.4 percent in the United States), and failing to meet the minimal 3.0 percent annual reductions in emissions currently needed to avoid a catastrophic destabilization of the earth’s energy balance, are simply incalculable.40

Nevertheless, major energy corporations continue to lie about climate change, promoting and bankrolling climate denialism—while admitting the truth in their internal documents. These corporations are working to accelerate the extraction and production of fossil fuels, including the dirtiest, most greenhouse gas-generating varieties, reaping enormous profits in the process. The melting of the Arctic ice from global warming is seen by capital as a new El Dorado, opening up massive additional oil and gas reserves to be exploited without regard to the consequences for the earth’s climate. In response to scientific reports on climate change, Exxon Mobil declared that it intends to extract and sell all of the fossil-fuel reserves at its disposal.41 Energy corporations continue to intervene in climate negotiations to ensure that any agreements to limit carbon emissions are defanged. Capitalist countries across the board are putting the accumulation of wealth for a few above combatting climate destabilization, threatening the very future of humanity.

#### Racial capitalism outweighs — Capitalism necessitates super-exploitation of the Global South, colonial dispossession, militaristic imperialism, and racial hierarchies to sustain itself. The system must be rejected on ethical grounds.

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Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

Footnote 14: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

Footnote 15: Borrowing from Karl Marx’s dictum that the labor process is the hidden abode of the capitalist production of value, and Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of reproduction as the even more hidden abode, or background condition, for the possibility of capitalist production, I understand Blackness as the obfuscated abode. The immense value of Blackness is obscured and rendered unintelligible by its positioning as worthlessness, as something that does not amount to anything—but that does not equal nothing. As a structural location at the intersection of indispensability and disposability, Blackness exceeds the category of race, is not reducible to class, and does not fit the specifications of caste.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus:

By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19

Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21

Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24

Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism.

Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29

Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism.

The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition.

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff and critically interrogate the neoliberal discourse of the 1AC — resisting capitalist pedagogy in educational spaces is the first step towards a broader movement away from Capitalism; COVID provides a unique transition opportunity.

Giroux 20, McMaster University Professor for Scholarship in the Public Interest and The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy (Henry, June 9th, “Racist Violence Can’t Be Separated from the Violence of Neoliberal Capitalism,” *Truthout*, <https://truthout.org/articles/racist-violence-cant-be-separated-from-the-violence-of-neoliberal-capitalism/>, Accessed 08-24-2021)

As educators, it is crucial for us to examine how we talk, teach, and write about inequality as an object of critique in an age of precarity, uncertainty and the current pandemic crisis. This is especially true at a time when a growing number of authoritarian regimes around the globe substitute replace thoughtful dialogue and critical engagement with the suppression of dissent and a culture of forgetting r. How do we situate our analysis of education as part of a broader discourse and mode of analysis that interrogates the promises, ideals, and claims of a substantive democracy? How do we fight against iniquitous relations of power and wealth that empty power of its emancipatory possibilities, and as Hannah Arendt has argued, “makes most people superfluous as human beings”? How might we understand how neoliberal ideology, with its appropriation of market-based values, regressive notions of freedom and agency, uses language to infiltrate daily life? How does a pandemic pedagogy in the service of neoliberalism produce identities defined by market values, and normalize a notion of responsibility and individuality that convinces people that whatever problem they face they have no one to blame but themselves? Repeated endlessly on right-wing media platforms, the underlying conditions that disproportionately produce chronic illness among poor people of color disappear among a public distracted, if not persuaded, by a pandemic pedagogy that celebrates unchecked self-interest, disdains social responsibility, and turns away from the reality of a society with deep-seated institutional rot and unravelling of social connections and the social contract.

Pandemic pedagogy thrives on inequality and becomes a militarized and heartless normalizing tool to convince the broader public that the lives of the elderly, sick, and vulnerable should be valued according to how much they contribute to the economy. And if they are willing to die in order not to be a drain on the economy, all well and good. Nothing escapes the cruel logic of neoliberalism with its arrogance and hubris on full display as it bathes in the glow of right-wing populism, ultra-nationalism, and neofascism. Its accoutrements of dictatorship are everywhere and can be seen in the swagger of militia that storm state capitals, in police who punch and pepper spray protesters and push elderly men to the ground, and in military forces on the streets without badges reinforcing a climate of fear, repression, and unaccountability. There is more at work here than a lack of humanity on the part of the Trump administration. As the Irish journalist Fintan O’Toole observes, there is also the deepening grip of a culture of cruelty and dehumanization. He writes:

“As a society the American people are being habituated into accepting cruelty on a wide scale. Americans are being taught by Trump and his administration not to see other people as human beings whose lives are as important as their own. Once that line has been crossed – and it is not just Trump and the people around him, but many of Trump’s supporters as well – then we know where that all leads, what the ultimate destination is. There is no mystery about it. We know what happens when a government and its leaders dehumanize large numbers of people.”

Depoliticization and the Authoritarian Turn

Neoliberalism is not only an economic system, it is also an ideological apparatus that relentlessly attempts to structure consciousness, values, desires, and modes of identification in ways that align individuals with its governing structures. Central to this pedagogical project is the attempt to prevent individuals from translating private issues and troubles into broader systemic considerations. By doing this, it becomes difficult for individuals to grasp the historical, social, economic, and political forces at work in shaping a social order as a human activity deeply immersed in specific relations of power. Neoliberalism’s attempt to erase or rewrite historical and social forces makes it difficult for individuals to imagine alternative notions of society, with themselves as collective actors, or view their problems as more than the limitations of faulty character, moral failure, or a problem of personal responsibility. Reducing individuals to isolated, discrete, hermetically-sealed human beings whose lives are shaped only by notions of self-reliance and self-sufficiency is a pedagogical strategy that utterly depoliticizes people, leading them to believe that however a society is shaped, it is part of a natural order. President Trump echoed this “no alternative” narrative when asked about celebrities and rich people having special access to being tested for the coronavirus while few others had access. He replied, “Perhaps that’s been the story of life.”

This individualization of the social with its mounting privatization, gated communities, and social atomization undermines collective action, any viable notion of solidarity, and weakens the notion of global connectivity. The philosopher Byung-Chul Han has rightly argued that contemporary neoliberal society is shaped by a dysfunctional notion of solitude and hermitically-sealed notions of agency, all of which undermine the values and social connections vital to a democracy. He writes:

“Those subject to the neoliberal economy do not constitute a we that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is making the space for collective action shrink… The general collapse of the collective and the communal has engulfed it. Solidarity is vanishing. Privatization now reaches into the depths of the soul itself. The erosion of the communal is making all collective efforts more and more unlikely.”

This panoptical nature of hyper-individualism is more aligned with shared fears than shared responsibilities. Under such circumstances, trust and the notion that all life is related become difficult to grasp as the myopic language of private self-interest inures individuals to wider social problems such as extreme inequality. There is no understanding in this discourse of the damage fanatical entrepreneurialism does to our embodied collectivity. Nor is there any value attributed to the important responsibilities, social values, and notion of the common good that exceeds who we are as individuals, or how we have been shaped by diverse social forces in particular ways.

It should be clear that questions of economic and social justice cannot be addressed by a neoliberal pedagogy that enshrines self-interest and privatization while converting every social problem into individualized market solutions or regressive matters of personal responsibility. Under neoliberalism’s disimagination machine, individual responsibility is coupled with an ethos of greed, avarice, and personal gain. One consequence is the tearing up of social solidarities, public values, and an almost pathological disdain for democracy. This radical form of privatization is also a powerful force for the rise of fascist politics because it depoliticizes individuals, immerses them in the logic of social Darwinism, and makes them susceptible to the dehumanization of those considered a threat or disposable.

Just as the spread of the pandemic virus in the United States was not an innocent act of nature, neither is the rise and pervasive grip of inequality. What is clear is that neoliberal support for unbridled individualism has weakened democratic pressures and eroded democracy and equality as governing principles. Moreover, as a mode of public pedagogy, it has undercut social provisions, the social contract, and support for public goods such as education, public health, essential infrastructure, public transportation, and the most basic elements of the welfare state. As a form of pedagogical practice, neoliberalism has morphed into a form of pandemic pedagogy that sacrifices social needs and human life in the name of an economic rationality that values reviving economic growth over human rights. As a lived system of meaning and values, self-reliance and rugged individualism are the only categories available for shaping how individuals view themselves, and their relationship to others and to the planet. The individualization of everyone and the reduction of social problems to private troubles is paralleled by sanctioning a world marked by borders, walls, racism, hate, and a rejection of government intervention in the interest of the common good. Most importantly, neoliberal individualization personalizes power, creating a depoliticized subject whose only obligation as a citizen is defined by consuming and living in a world free from ethical and social responsibilities. In many ways, it does not just empty politics of any substance, it destroys its emancipatory prospects.

The neoliberal strategists use education not only to mask their abuses and the effects of their criminogenic policies, they also – in a time of crisis, when dissatisfaction of the masses might lead to chaos, revolts, and dangerous levels of resistance – move dangerously close to creating the conditions for a fascist politics. The noted theologian Frei Betto is right in stating that under such conditions, “…they cover up the causes of social ills and cover up their effects with ideologies that, by obscuring causes, fuel mood in the face of the effects. That’s why neoliberalism is now showing its authoritarian face – building walls that divide countries and ethnic groups, executive power over legislature and judiciary, disinformation about digital networks, the cult of the homeland, the brazen offensive against human rights.”

Neoliberalism and its regressive notion of individualism and individual responsibility has undermined the belief that human beings both make the world and can change it. The pandemic has ushered in a crisis that undermines that belief and opens the door for rethinking what kind of society and notion of politics will be faithful to the creation of a socialist democracy that speaks to the core values of justice, equality and solidarity. Under such circumstances, private resistance must give way to collective resistance, and personal and political rights must include economic rights. If inequality is to be defeated, the social state must replace the corporate state and social rights must be guaranteed for all. There can be no adequate struggle for economic justice and social equality unless economic inequality on a global level is addressed along with a movement for climate justice, the elimination of systemic racism and a halt to the spiraling militarism that has resulted in endless wars. This can only take place if the anti-democratic ideology of neoliberalism, with its collapse of the public into the private and its institutional structures of domination, are fully addressed and discredited. Étienne Balibar is right in stating that the triumph of neoliberalism has resulted in the “death zones of humanity.” Following Balibar, what must be made clear is that neoliberal capitalism is itself a pandemic and a dangerous harbinger of an updated fascist politics.

Overcoming Pandemic Pedagogy

The kind of societies that will emerge after the pandemic is up for grabs. In some cases, the crisis will give way to authoritarian regimes such as Chile, Hungary and Turkey, all of which have used the urgency of COVID-19 as an excuse to impose more state control and surveillance, squelch dissent, eliminate civil liberties and concentrate power in the hands of an authoritarian political class. As is well documented, history in a time of crisis also has the potential to change dominant ideologies, rethink the meaning of governance, and enlarge the sphere of justice and equality through a vision that fights for a more generous and inclusive politics. It is crucial to rethink the project of politics in order to imagine forms of resistance that are collective, inclusive and global, capable of producing new democratic arrangements for social life, more radical values and a “global economy which will no longer be at the mercy of market mechanisms.” This is a politics that must move beyond siloed identities and fractured political factions in order to build transnational solidarities in the service of an alternative radically democratic society. Making the pedagogical more political means challenging those forms of pandemic pedagogy that turn politics into theater, a favorite tactic of Trump. In this case, the performance works to suspend disbelief, hold power accountable and unravel one’s sense of critical agency. Pandemic pedagogy does more than undermine critical thinking and informed judgments, it dissolves the line between the truth and lies, fantasy and reality, and in doing so, destroys the foundation for understanding, engaging and promoting that social and economic justice. The endgame under the rubric of a pandemic pedagogy is not simply the destruction of the truth, but the elimination of democracy itself.

Central to developing an alternative democratic vision is development of a language that refuses to look away and be commodified. Such a language should be able to break through the continuity and consensus of common sense and appeals to the natural order of things. At stake here is the need to reclaim both critical and redemptive elements of a radical democracy in order to address the full spectrum of violence that structures institutions and everyday life in the United States. This is a language connected to the acquisition of civic literacy, and it demands a different regime of desires and identifications to enable us to move from “shock and stunned silence toward a coherent visceral speech, one as strong as the force that is charging at us.”

Of course, there is more at stake here than a struggle over meaning; there is also the struggle over power, over the need to create a formative culture that will produce informed critical agents who will fight for and contribute to a broad social movement that will translate meaning into a fierce struggle for economic, political and social justice. Agency in this sense must be connected to a notion of possibility and education in the service of radical change. Reimagining the future only becomes meaningful when it is rooted in a fierce struggle against the horrors and totalitarian practices of a pandemic pedagogy that falsely claims that it exists outside of history.

Václav Havel, the late Czech political dissident-turned-politician, once argued that politics follows culture, by which he meant that changing consciousness is the first step toward building mass movements of resistance. What is crucial here in the age of multiple crises is a thorough grasp of the notion that critical and engaged forms of agency are a product of emancipatory education. Moreover, at the heart of any viable notion of politics is the recognition that politics begins with attempts to change the way people think, act and feel with respect to both how they view themselves and their relations to others. There is more to agency than the neoliberal emphasis on the “empire of the self,” with its unchecked belief in the virtues of a form of self-interest that despises the bonds of sociality, solidarity and community.

The U.S. is in the midst of a political and pedagogical crisis. This is a crisis defined not only by a brutalizing racism and massive inequality, but also a constitutional crisis produced by a growing authoritarianism that has been in the making for some time. The recent attacks by the police on journalists, peaceful protesters and even elderly people marching for racial justice echoes the violence of the Brownshirts in the 1930s. Let’s stop the futile debate about whether or not the U.S. is in the midst of a fascist state and shift the register to the more serious question of how to resist it and restore a semblance of real democracy.

Under such circumstances, education should be viewed as central to politics, and it plays a crucial role in producing informed judgments, actions, morality and social responsibility at the forefront not only of agency, but politics itself. In this scenario, truth and politics mutually inform each other to erupt in a pedagogical awakening at the moment when the rules are broken. Taking risks becomes a necessity, self-reflection narrates its capacity for critically engaged agency and thinking the impossible is not an option, but a necessity. Without an informed and educated citizenry, democracy can lead to tyranny, even fascism.

Trump represents the malignant presence of a fascism that never dies and is ready to remerge at different times in different context in sometimes not-so-recognizable forms. The COVID-19 crisis and the pandemic of inequality and racism have revealed elements of a fascist politics that are more than abstractions. The struggle against a fascist politics is now visible in the rebellions taking place across the United States. While there are no political guarantees for a victory, there is a new sense that the future can be changed in the image of a just and sustainable society. There is a new energy for reform taking place in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. Massive protests for racial, economic and social justice are emerging all over the globe. As I have argued in The Terror of the Unforeseen, at stake here is the need for these protests to transition from a pedagogical moment and collective outburst of moral anger to a progressive international movement that is well organized and unified. Such a movement must build solidarity among different groups, imagine new forms of social life, make the impossible possible, and produce a revolutionary project in defense of equality, social justice and popular sovereignty. The racial, class, ecological and public health crisis facing the globe can only be understood as part of a comprehensive crisis of the totality. Immediate solutions such as defunding the police and improving community services are important, but they do not deal with the larger issue of eliminating a neoliberal system structured in massive racial and economic inequalities. David Harvey is right in arguing that the “immediate task is nothing more nor less than the self-conscious construction of a new political framework for approaching the question of inequality, through a deep and profound critique of our economic and social system.” This is a crisis in which different threads of oppression must be understood as part of the general crisis of capitalism. The various protests now evolving internationally at the popular level offer the promise of new global anti-fascist and anti-capitalist movements. In the current moment, democracy may be under a severe threat and appear frighteningly vulnerable, but with young people and others rising up across the globe — inspired, energized and marching in the streets — the future of a radical democracy is waiting to breathe again.

### 1NC---T: Private Sector

#### Next off is T private sector

#### Private sector means all non-governmental persons or entities, including non-profits

Senate Report 95 (Senate Report. 104-1, “UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM ACT OF 1995,” <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/senate-report/1> , date accessed 9/10/21)

"Private sector" is defined to cover all persons or entities in the United States except for State, local or tribal governments. It includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, and educational and nonprofit institutions.

#### A topical aff could change a universally-applied standard, like the CWS [Consumer Welfare Standard]

Phillips 18, commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission. (Noah J. November 1, 2018, Before the Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,” <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf>)

Our second topic today is the consumer welfare standard. And I think most folks even out in the public know, this is the standard that we use across the board, mergers and conduct in courts and at agencies, to judge anticompetitive conduct. It is not only a standard that we in the U.S. apply, it is a standard that is used by competition agencies around the world. It is an economically-grounded standard, and it requires that there be harm to consumers for conduct to be condemned. Mere harm to competitors is considered insufficient. So let me repeat that again. There has to be harm to consumers, not just competitors. The reason that is so, the reason harm to competitors is considered insufficient is because sometimes a less-efficient firm losing sales or market share to a cheaper, more innovative or efficient rival, can be and often is consistent with vibrant competition and with outcomes that benefit consumers. Courts and agencies have embraced this standard for decades. Today, there are two very important discussions going on about the consumer welfare standard, and they are happening simultaneously. And I think it is important that we understand that there are two conversations going on. One is a continuing discussion about how we apply the standard, regarding whether enforcement is at the appropriate level, whether it is properly targeted. This is an introspective question on some level, in which scholars, economists, practitioners, and enforcers all ask ourselves, are we bringing the right kinds of cases? Are we using the right kinds of evidence? Should we be doing more or less in certain places? The antitrust bar, the business community, and others benefit from this ongoing and active analysis. The second discussion happening now, and the one on which today’s consumer welfare standard panels will focus, is whether the standard is itself the right metric we ought to use in antitrust enforcement and in antitrust law; some argue that enforcement under the consumer welfare standard has failed because of the law, and accordingly, that we should reform the law.

#### Violation: the aff applies exclusively to conduct in a specific segment of the private sector.

#### Vote neg:

#### FIRST---limits and ground---the number of potential subsets is infinite---any industry, product, single companies, individuals---undermines clash. Only big affs have link uniqueness.

#### SECOND----precision---our interp has intent to define, exclude and is in legislative context.

### 1NC---T: Only Congress

#### T-Congress

#### Expand requires a “change in the law”

Hatter 90 (HATTER, District Judge. Opinion in In re Eastport Associates, 114 BR 686 - Dist. Court, CD California 1990. Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/12/21)

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### That’s change must be a material modification of the language of the statute

Iowa Supreme Court 4 (CADY, Justice. Opinion in State v. Truesdell, 679 NW 2d 611 - Iowa: Supreme Court 2004. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 9/13/21)

Generally, a material modification of the language of a statute gives rise to "a presumption that a change in the law was intended." Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002); see 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22.1, at 240-41 (6th ed.2002). The existence of this presumption is enhanced "when the amendment follows a contrary... judicial interpretation of an unambiguous statute." Midwest Auto. III, LLC, 646 N.W.2d at 425.

#### Antitrust laws are statutes

Kalbfleisch 61(KALBFLEISCH, District Judge. Opinion in Paul M. Harrod Company v. AB Dick Company, 194 F. Supp. 502 - Dist. Court, ND Ohio 1961. Google scholar caselaw, date accessed 9/11/21)

Defendant asserts that the term "antitrust laws," as used in the above section and as defined in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, does not include a judgment or decree entered in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that "the violation of the earlier decree of this court in itself gives rise to an independent cause of action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act." 15 U.S.C.A. § 15. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 7. Plaintiff concedes that "as far as he has been able to ascertain, this contention raises issues which have never before been decided by any appellate court." Plaintiff's Brief, p. 5.

In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 1958, 355 U.S. 373, 78 S.Ct. 352, 2 L.Ed. 2d 340, the Supreme Court held that the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13-13b, 21a, was not included among the "antitrust laws" defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 12) and that "the definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive." Id., 355 U. S. at page 376, 78 S.Ct. at page 354.

The definition of "antitrust laws" in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, clearly embraces only the statutes described therein. Even without such a definition the term "antitrust laws" could not be construed as pertaining to a judgment or decree entered by a court in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Such decrees do not necessarily reflect the prohibitions of the antitrust laws but may, by their terms, seek to dissipate the effects of the past conduct of the parties and, to this end, frequently enjoin performance of acts lawful in themselves. To permit a private party to recover damages for violation of any provision of such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion.

#### Violation---the aff isn’t Congress.

#### VOTE NEG:

#### First---Ground---Congressional change guarantees core DAs like horse-trading and politics, and have link uniqueness because of decades of Congressional inertia.

#### Second---Functional Limits---forces aff to have a comparative solvency advocate, which constrains aff choice. It’s try-or-die for an agential constraint because the topic is bidirectional and unlimited.

### 1NC---Horsetrading DA

#### Antitrust only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions

Perera 3-12-2021, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That allows the GOP to successfully weaponize misinformation---triggers epistemic decay and cements a perma-GOP government

Carpenter 21, contributing writer for The Nation. She received the James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism in 2018, and has been a finalist for the Livingston Awards and the National Awards for Education Reporting. Her writing has also appeared in Rolling Stone, Guernica, and various other publications (Zoe, “Misinformation Is Destroying Our Country. Can Anything Rein It In?,” *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/right-wing-media-misinformation/>)

Natali Fierros Bock says she could feel this mass delusion calcifying in the wake of the election in Pinal County, a rural area between Phoenix and Tucson where she serves as co–executive director of the group Rural Arizona Engagement. “It feels like an existential crisis,” Bock adds. Many of the Sharpiegate claims online referred to Pinal County, and Gosar, whose district includes a portion of the area, was reportedly responsible for helping organize the January 6 “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington that resulted in the deaths of five people. Mark Finchem, a Republican who represents part of Pinal County in the statehouse, was also in Washington on January 6. The Capitol insurrection threw into relief the real-world consequences of America’s increasingly siloed media ecosystem, which is characterized on the right by an expanding web of outlets and platforms willing to entertain an alternative version of reality. Social media companies, confronted with their role in spreading misinformation, scrambled to implement reforms. But right-wing misinformation is not just a technological problem, and it is far from being fixed. Any hope that the events of January 6 might provoke a reckoning within conservative media and the Republican Party has by now evaporated. The GOP remains eager to weaponize misinformation, not only to win elections but also to advance its policy agenda. A prime example is the aggressive effort under way in a number of states to restrict access to the ballot. In Arizona, Republicans have introduced nearly two dozen bills that would make it more difficult to vote, with the big lie about election fraud as a pretext. “When you can sell somebody the idea that their elections were stolen, they’ve been violated, right? So then you need protection,” Bock says, explaining the conservative justification for the suite of new restrictions in her state. Voting rights is her organization’s “number one concern” at the moment. But Bock’s fears about political misinformation are more sweeping. Community organizing is difficult in the best of times. “But when you can’t agree on what is true and not true, when my reality doesn’t match the reality of the person I’m speaking to, it makes it more difficult to find common ground,” she says. “If we can’t agree on a common truth, if we can’t find a starting place, then how does it end?” Around the time of the 2016 election, Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who studies misinformation during crises, noticed that more and more social media users were incorporating markers of political identity into their online personas—hashtags and memes and other signifiers of their ideological alignment. In the footage from the Capitol she saw the same symbols, outfits, and flags as those she’d been watching spread in far-right communities online. “To see those caricatures come alive in this violent riot or insurrection, whatever you want to call it, was horrifying, but it was all very recognizable for me,” Starbird says. “There was a time in which we were like, ‘Oh, those are bots, those aren’t real people,’ or ‘That’s someone play-acting,’ or ‘We’re putting on our online persona and that doesn’t really reflect who we are in an offline sense.’ January 6 pretty much disabused us of that notion.” It was a particularly rude awakening for social media companies, which had long been reluctant to respond to the misinformation that flourished on their platforms, treating it as an issue of speech that could be divorced from real-world consequences. Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms had made some changes in anticipation of a contested election, announcing plans to label or remove content delegitimizing election results, for instance. Facebook blocked new campaign ads for the week leading up to the election; Twitter labeled hundreds of thousands of misleading tweets with fact-checking notes. Yet wild claims about election fraud spread virally anyway, ping-ponging from individual social media users to right-wing influencers and media. During the 2016 campaign, most public concern about misinformation centered on shadowy foreign actors posing as news sources or US citizens. This turned out to be an oversimplification, though many on the center and left offered it as an explanation for Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016; blaming Russian state actors alone ignored factors like sexism, missteps made by the Clinton campaign itself, and the home-grown feedback loop of right-wing media. In 2020, according to research done by Starbird and other contributors to the Election Integrity Project, those most influential in disseminating misinformation were largely verified, “blue check” social media users who were authentic, in the sense that they were who they said they were—Donald Trump, for example, and his adult sons. DONATE NOW TO POWER THE NATION. Readers like you make our independent journalism possible. Another key aspect in the creation of the big lie was what Starbird calls “participatory disinformation.” Trump was tweeting about the election being stolen from him months beforehand, but once voting got under way, “what we see is that he kind of relies on the crowd, the audiences, to create the evidence to fit the frame,” Starbird explains. Individuals posted their personal experiences online, which were shared by more influential accounts and eventually featured in media stories that placed the anecdotes within the broader narrative of a stolen election. Some of the anecdotes that fueled Sharpiegate came from people who used a felt-tip pen to vote in person, then saw online that their vote had been canceled—though the “canceled” vote actually referred to mail-in ballots that voters had requested before deciding to vote in person. “It’s a really powerful kind of propaganda, because the people that were helping to create these narratives really did think they were experiencing fraud,” Starbird says. Action by content moderators usually came too late and was complicated by the fact that many claims of disenfranchisement by individual users were difficult to verify or disprove. The Capitol riot led the tech giants to take more aggressive action against Trump and other peddlers of misinformation. Twitter and Facebook kicked Trump off their platforms and shut down tens of thousands of accounts and pages. Facebook clamped down on some of its groups, which the company’s own data scientists had previously warned were incubating misinformation and “enthusiastic calls for violence,” according to an internal presentation. Google and Apple booted Parler, a social media site used primarily by the far right, from their app stores, and Amazon stopped hosting Parler’s data on its cloud infrastructure system, forcing it temporarily offline. But these measures were largely reactions to harm already done. “Moderation doesn’t reduce the demand for [misleading] content, and demand for that content has grown during some periods of time when the platforms weren’t moderating or weren’t addressing some of the more egregious ways their tools were abused,” says Renée DiResta, technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. Deplatforming individuals or denying service to companies that tolerate violent rhetoric, as Amazon did with Parler, can have an impact, particularly in the short term and when done at scale. It reduces the reach of influential liars and can make it more difficult for “alt-tech” apps to operate. A notorious example of deplatforming involved Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist behind the site Infowars. Jones was kicked off Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and Spotify in 2018 for his repeated endorsement of violence. He lost nearly 2.5 million subscribers on YouTube alone, and in the three weeks after his accounts were cut off, Infowars’ daily average visits dropped from close to 1.4 million to 715,000. But Jones didn’t disappear—he migrated to Parler, Gab, and other alt-tech platforms, and he spoke at a rally in Washington the night before the Capitol attack. One outcome of unplugging Trump and other right-wing influencers has been a surge of interest in those alternative social media platforms, where more dangerous echo chambers can form and, in encrypted spaces, be more difficult to monitor. “Isn’t this just going to make the extreme communities worse? Yes,” says Ethan Zuckerman, founder of the Institute for Digital Public Infrastructure at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “But we’re already headed there, and at least the good news is that [extremists] aren’t going to be recruiting in these mainstream spaces.” The bad news, in Zuckerman’s view, is that the far right is now leading the effort to create new forms of online community. “The Nazis right now have an incentive to build alternative distributed media, and the rest of us are behind, because we don’t have the incentive to do it,” Zuckerman explains. He argues that a digital infrastructure that is smaller, distributed, and not-for-profit is the path to a better Internet. “And my real deep fear is that we end up ceding the design of this way of building social networks to far-right extremists, because they are the ones who need these new spaces to discuss and organize.” In March, Trump spokesman Jason Miller said on Fox that the former president was likely to return to social media this spring “with his own platform.” A more fundamental problem than Trump’s presence or absence on Twitter is the power that a single executive—Jack Dorsey, in the case of Twitter—has in making that decision. Social media companies have become so big that they have little fear of accountability in the form of competition. “To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons,” concluded a recent report by the staff of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust. For now, the reforms at Facebook and other companies remain largely superficial. The platforms are still based on algorithms that reward outrageous content and are still financed via the collection and sale of user data. Karen Hao of MIT Technology Review recently reported that a former Facebook AI researcher told her “his team conducted ‘study after study’ confirming the same basic idea: models that maximize engagement increase polarization.” Hao’s investigation concluded that Facebook leadership’s relentless pursuit of growth “repeatedly weakened or halted many initiatives meant to clean up misinformation on the platform.” The modest “break glass” measures Facebook took during the election in response to the swell of misinformation, which included tweaks to its ranking algorithm to emphasize news sources it considered “authoritative,” have already been reversed. Tech companies could do more, as the election-time tweaks revealed. But they still “refuse to see misinformation as a core feature of their product,” says Joan Donovan, research director for the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. The problem of misinformation appears so vast “because that’s exactly what the technology allows.” There are some signs of a growing appetite for regulation on Capitol Hill. Democrats have proposed reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which insulates tech companies from legal liability for content posted to their platforms, such as requiring more transparency about content moderation and opening platforms to lawsuits in limited circumstances when content causes real-world harm. (GOP critiques of Section 230, on the other hand, make the false argument that it allows platforms to discriminate against conservatives.) Another legislative tactic would focus on the algorithms that platforms use to amplify content, rather than on the content itself. A bill introduced by two House Democrats would make companies liable if their algorithms promote content linked to acts of violence. Democratic lawmakers are also eyeing changes to antitrust law, while several antitrust lawsuits have been filed against Facebook and Google. But litigation could take years. Even breaking up Big Tech would leave intact its predatory business model. To address this, Zuckerman and other experts have called for a tax on targeted digital advertising. Such a tax would discourage targeted advertising, and the revenue could be used to fund public-service media. Held to account? Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testified remotely before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2020. (Matt York / AP) Social media plays a key role in amplifying conspiracy theories and political misinformation, but it didn’t create them. “When we think of disinformation as something that appeared [only in the Trump era], and that we used to have this agreed-upon narrative of what was true and then social platforms came into the picture and now that’s all fragmented… that makes a lot of assumptions about the idea that everyone used to agree on what was true and what was false,” says Alice E. Marwick, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina who studies social media and society. Politicians have long leveraged misinformation, particularly racist tropes. But it’s been made particularly potent not just by social media, Marwick argues, but by the right-wing media industry that profits from lies. “The American online public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio public sphere that was already deeply broken,” argue Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society in their book Network Propaganda. The collapse of local news left a vacuum that for many Americans has been filled by partisan outlets that, on the right, are characterized by blatant disregard for journalistic standards of sourcing and verification. This insulated world of right-wing outlets, which stretches from those that bill themselves as objective sources, Fox News chief among them, to talk radio and extreme sites like Infowars and The Gateway Pundit, “represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the American media system,” the authors write. The conservative movement spent decades building this apparatus to peddle lies and fear along with miracle cures and pyramid schemes, and was so successful that Fox and other far-right outlets ended up in a tight two-step with the White House. Fox chairman Rupert Murdoch maintained a close relationship with Trump, as did Sean Hannity and former Fox News copresident Bill Shine, who became White House communications director in 2018. The backlash against Fox in the wake of the election hinted at a possible dethroning of the ruler of the right’s media machine. Its farther-right rival Newsmax TV posted a higher rating than Fox for the first time ever in the month after the election, following supportive tweets from Trump, and during the week of November 9 it passed Breitbart as the most-visited conservative website. But Fox quickly regained its perch. The network backpedaled rapidly during its post-election ratings slump, firing an editor who’d defended the projection of a Biden win in Arizona and replacing news programming with opinion content. According to Media Matters, Fox News pushed the idea of a stolen election nearly 800 times in the two weeks after declaring Biden the winner. The network’s ad revenue increased 31 percent during the final quarter of 2020, while its parent company, Fox Corporation, saw a 17 percent jump in pretax profit. The far-right media ecosystem has become so powerful in part because there’s been no downside to lying. Instead, the Trump administration demonstrated that there was a market opportunity in serving up misinformation that purports to back up what people want to believe. “In this day and age, people want something that tends to affirm their views and opinions,” Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy told The New York Times’ Ben Smith in an interview published shortly after the election. Claims of a rigged election were “great for news,” he said in another interview. Trump’s departure from the White House won’t necessarily reduce the demand for this kind of content. Since the Capitol riot, two voting-systems companies have launched an unusual effort to hold right-wing outlets and influencers accountable for some of the lies they’ve spread. Dominion Voting Systems, a major provider of voting technology, and another company called Smartmatic were the subjects of myriad outlandish claims related to election fraud, many of which were used in lawsuits filed by Trump’s campaign and were repeatedly broadcast on Fox, Newsmax TV, and OAN. Since January the companies have filed several defamation suits against Trump campaign lawyers Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, and Fox News and three of its hosts. Dominion alleges that as a result of false accusations, its “founder and employees have been harassed and have received death threats, and Dominion has suffered unprecedented and irreparable harm.” The threat of legal action forced a number of media companies to issue corrections for stories about supposed election meddling that mentioned Dominion. The conservative website American Thinker published a statement admitting its stories about Dominion were “completely false and have no basis in fact” and “rel[ied] on discredited sources who have peddled debunked theories.” OAN simply deleted all of the stories about Dominion from its website without comment. These lawsuits will not dismantle the world of right-wing media, but they have prompted a more robust debate about how media and social media companies could be held liable for lies that turn lethal—and whether this type of legal action should be pursued, given the protections afforded by the First Amendment and the fact that the powerful often use libel law to bully journalists. Alternative reality: Trump supporters in Maricopa County derided Fox for reporting on election night that Biden had won the state. (Hannah McKay / Pool / Getty Images) Ethan Zuckerman has been thinking about how to build a better Internet for years, a preoccupation not unrelated to the fact that, in the 1990s, he wrote the code that created pop-up ads. (“I’m sorry. Our intentions were good,” he wrote in 2014.) Still, he believes that framing misinformation as a problem of media and technology is myopic. “It’s very hard to conclude that this is purely an informational problem,” Zuckerman says. “It’s a power problem.” The GOP is increasingly tolerant of, and even reliant on, weaponized misinformation. “We’re in a place where the Republican Party realizes that as much as 70 percent of their voters don’t believe that Biden was legitimately elected, and they are now deeply reluctant to contradict what their voters believe,” Zuckerman says. Republicans are reluctant, at least in part, because of a legitimate fear of primary challenges from the right, but also because they learned from Trump the power of using conspiracy theories to mobilize alienated voters by preying on their deep mistrust of public institutions. It’s one thing for an ordinary citizen to retweet a false claim; it’s another for elected officials to legitimize conspiracy theories. But holding the GOP to account may prove to be even harder than reforming Big Tech. The radical grass roots have been empowered by small-dollar fundraising and gerrymandering, while more moderate Republicans are retiring or leaving the party. Writer Erick Trickey argued recently in The Washington Post that what undercut a similar wave of conservative crackpot paranoia driven by the John Birch Society in the 1960s was explicit denunciation by prominent conservatives like William Buckley and Ronald Reagan as well as Republican congressional leaders. But today’s party leaders have been unwilling to excommunicate conspiracy-mongers. In the aftermath of the Capitol riot, elected officials who spread rumors that the violence was actually the result of antifascists—including Arizona’s Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs—gained notoriety, while those critical of Trump were publicly humiliated. The embrace of conspiratorial narratives has been particularly pronounced in state GOP organizations. The Texas GOP recently incorporated the QAnon slogan “We are the storm” into official publicity media, and the Oregon GOP’s executive committee endorsed the theory that the riot had been a “false flag” operation. In March, members of the Oregon GOP voted to replace its Trump-supporting chairman with a candidate even farther out on the extremist fringe. Weaponized misinformation could have a lasting impact not only on the shape of the GOP but also on public policy. Republicans are now using the big lie to try to restrict voting rights in Arizona, Georgia, and dozens of other states. As of February 19, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, lawmakers in 43 states had introduced more than 250 bills restricting access to voting, “over seven times the number of restrictive bills as compared to roughly this time last year.” In late March, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed a 95-page bill making it harder to vote in that state in a number of ways. Many of the far-right extremists, politicians, and media influencers who spread misinformation about the presidential election are now pushing falsehoods about Covid-19 vaccines. The rumors, which have spread on social media apps like Telegram that are frequented by QAnon adherents and militia groups, among others, range from standard anti-vax talking points to absurd claims that the vaccines are part of a secret plan hatched by Bill Gates to implant trackable microchips, or that they cause infertility or alter human DNA. Sidestepping the craziest conspiracies, prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who has become one of the GOP’s leading purveyors of misinformation, are casting doubt about vaccine safety under the pretense of “just asking questions.” Vaccine misinformation plays into the longstanding conservative effort to sow mistrust in government, and it appears to be having an effect: A third of Republicans now say they don’t want to get vaccinated. These are the true costs of misinformation: deadly riots, policy changes that could disenfranchise legitimate voters, scores of preventable deaths. These translate into financial externalities: the additional expense of securing the Capitol, additional dollars devoted to the pandemic response. More abstract but no less real are the social costs: the parents lost down QAnon rabbit holes, the erosion of factual foundations that permit productive argument. The problem with the far right’s universe of “alternative facts” is not that it’s hermetically sealed from the universe the rest of us live in. Rather, it’s that these universes cannot truly be separated. If we’ve learned anything in the past six months, it’s that epistemological distance doesn’t prevent collisions in the real world that can be lethal to individuals—and potentially ruinous for democratic systems.

#### Disinformation undermines collective responses to existential threats

Roston 21, citing Bak-Coleman, PhD, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Washington Center for an Informed Public (Eric, “As Climate Change Fries the World, Social Media Is Frying Our Brains,” *Bloomberg News*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-29/as-climate-change-fries-the-world-social-media-is-frying-our-brains>)

Amid emergency heat, flooding, and famine, it’s even more critical that people recognize and agree at least on the big picture. And yet, as recent history has shown us time and again, they don’t. Much of that can be blamed on the pandemic of misinformation—concerning climate change, Covid-19, vaccines, and so much more— now running rampant on social media. It reminds Joseph Bak-Coleman of fish. Bak-Coleman is the lead author of a provocative new article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences about scientists’ inability thus far to adequately inform policymakers about how digital technology is impeding efforts to solve climate change and other collective-behavior problems. Individual fish swimming in a school intuit each other so rapidly and clearly that they can instantaneously and in unison pivot away from whatever dangers they encounter. Insofar as that is true, they have a limited error margin for passing along bad information. “It costs energy when you get scared for no reason, and it also costs life if you don’t get scared when you should,” said Bak-Coleman, a University of Washington postdoctoral scholar with expertise in neuroscience and evolutionary biology. “Animal groups are highly tuned to do these really fantastic feats of behavior. But it’s all quite fragile.” The development of digital communications has eroded or vaporized community protections developed over millennia to ensure at least a minimally healthy flow of information, which leads to healthy decision-making. That loss, Bak-Coleman and his co-authors write, “combined with rapid distribution of falsehood, may present one of the larger threats to human well-being.” Think of it like this. If you wanted to make the most obvious statement in the world, you could do worse than: “Technology now allows people to communicate instantaneously and across great distances.” Yet if you wanted to elicit the most tortured answer in the world, you might ask something incredibly similar: “What happens when people can communicate instantaneously and across great distances?” The tension between the obvious statement and the unanswerable question—which holds within it just about all of the world’s large-scale problems, including climate change—is so great, Bak-Coleman and his colleagues propose a whole new academic discipline just to try to understand it. As physiology has medicine and climate science has emissions-mitigation and adaptation–planning, they argue, the digital-misinformation pandemic requires an applied science—or as they call it, a “crisis discipline.” The need for such a discipline is also urgent, they argue, because “given that algorithms and companies are already altering our global patterns of behavior for financial reasons, there is no safe hands-off approach.” Despite the many joys and productive uses of digital communication, it routinely conveys so many falsehoods, so quickly, that many people are left either unable to see or unwilling to fix existential dilemmas, leaving humanity overall in a precarious condition.

## ADVANTAGE 1

### 1NC---Courts Circumvent

#### Courts circumvent.

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/)

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

### 1NC---!D---Mexico Collapse

#### No Mexican state collapse -- experts

Daudelin, 12 - Professor @ Carleton, development and conflict (Jean, “The State And Security in Mexico” http://books.google.com/books?id=o-Tu81Bq6s4C&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=mexico+state+collapse&source=bl&ots=Yhx\_8YtFb4&sig=pa7WFUmTZL9ABazqwXvl8euUKw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=46UHVNGWOIfxgwSRlYDACg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgU#v=onepage&q=mexico%20state%20collapse&f=false)

A careful look at the evidence and the fact that the U.S. seems to be disengaging from what has ultimately been a limited involvement in the region's drug and organized-crime scene suggests that, from whichever angle one looks at the problem, the latter does not represent a very significant threat to U.S. security. In that context, a sizable increase in Canada's involvement can hardly be justified by the dangers the problem represents to its main ally. The prospects of narco-traffickers provoking a state collapse in Mexico are essentially nonexistent, notwithstanding alarmist declarations by some U.S. public officials.14 No reputable expert on the country has supported that view.54 Such prospects for Guatemala, Honduras, or even El Salvador are much less far-fetched, however, which is why an effort is currently being made by the World Bank, the European Union, the U.S., and Canada to bolster the region's governments\* individual and collective capacity to confront the organized-crime challenge." It is difficult to argue, however, that the emergence of a narco-state or some kind of state collapse in Central America and the Caribbean would represent a significant threat for Canada itself. These regions—Central America and Haiti in particular—have long been plagued by corruption, violence, and instability and have previously-seen long episodes of civil war without any ripple effect on Canada. Were such developments to occur, they would create, relative to North America, the situation that currently exists in the urban peripheries of large Latin American countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, whose stability and economic prospects are not significantly impacted by the anarchy and violence that prevail in small "uncontrolled territories."

### 1NC---!D---Latin America

#### No chance of great-power draw-in to Latin America.

Malamud & Schenoni 20, \*Andrés, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, Portugal. Twitter: @andresmalamud Luis L., upcoming research fellow at the University of Konstanz, Germany. (9-10-2020, "Latin America Is Off the Global Stage, and That's OK", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/10/latin-america-global-stage-imperialism-geopolitics/)

But well into the 21st century, what if Latin America is so unimportant it isn’t even on the menu? Compare it with other decolonized, developing regions. Today, Africa is home to a fifth of humanity, and demographic trends suggest it might become a serious driver of global economic growth in a couple of decades. On the flipside, extreme poverty makes it a ticking bomb, with millions of people just a boat away from aging Europe. This means that, for better or worse, Africa is becoming increasingly geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the great powers.

This assessment applies even more clearly to Asia and the Middle East. Asia is the current driver of global economic growth and hosts the only challenger to American hegemony, which is winding up in quarrels with all of its neighbors. The Middle East has the largest energy reserves in the world and remains the epicenter of violent political conflict. In contrast, Latin America is declining in both economic weight and political relevance. It offers less promise and poses a smaller threat, and therefore is unlikely to be either courted or feared. Yet, you may think, it could still be eaten.

What in Latin America could still make the great powers’ mouth water? Early in the unipolar moment, the region was still relatively special to the United States thanks to the combination of energy, migration, and cocaine. Oil from Venezuela, migrants from Mexico, and drugs from Colombia were the main concerns. Today, the United States is close to self-sufficiency in both energy and drugs, and Mexico is retaining not only its own population but Central American refugees as well.

Direct intervention has long become unnecessary. Historically the United States has intervened, either overtly or covertly, to prevent extra-regional powers from meddling in the Western Hemisphere. But this is not the case with China—and is unlikely to be. In 2016, one of us published a collective study showing how Beijing filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the region without threatening U.S. strategic interests. Since then, despite heightened rhetoric about a “troika of tyranny” (of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) backed by Beijing, or perhaps because of it, China has turned inward and backed off on its economic statecraft.

### 1NC---!D---Heg

#### No leadership impact---empirics.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

### 1NC---!D---Biod

#### Alt causes to biodiversity collapse---deforestation, emissions, are larger internal links than Opioids.

## ADVANTAGE 2

### 1NC---Xenophobia Turn

#### The 1AC’s attempt to maintain economic dominance over China policy locks in a new cold war replete with xenophobia and the looming risk of military conflict.

Jeet Heer 21, national affairs correspondent at The Nation and the author of In Love with Art: Francoise Mouly’s Adventures in Comics with Art Spiegelman (2013) and Sweet Lechery: Reviews, Essays and Profiles (2014). “Biden’s China Problem: Resisting a New Cold War in Asia,” The Nation, 1/9/21, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/biden-china-cold-war/>

President Barack Obama also valued integration with China, though he was more mindful of its costs. As he notes in his new memoir, A Promised Land, “Back in the early 1990s, leaders of organized labor had sounded the alarm about China’s increasingly unfair trading practices.” In recalibrating US China policy, Obama and his administration tried “to thread the needle between too tough and not tough enough…by presenting [then-President Hu Jintao] with a list of problem areas we wanted to see fixed over a realistic time frame, while avoiding a public confrontation that might further spook the jittery financial markets.” The key tool Obama wanted to use to nudge China was a new US-Asia trade agreement “with an emphasis on locking in the types of enforceable labor and environmental provisions that Democrats and unions complained had been missing in previous deals.”

Obama’s needle-threading proved too subtle for the public. Donald Trump rode to electoral victory in 2016 in no small part by harnessing anti-trade emotions and promising to get tough with China. As president, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Obama had negotiated, ending the strategy of using agreements with China’s neighbors as a way of checking the rising Asian power. Instead, Trump pursued a bilateral trade war, seasoned with xenophobic rhetoric and amplified after the pandemic with tirades against “the China virus.”

Trump’s buffoonery is easy to ridicule, especially since his trade war only marginally changed America’s vast web of economic ties with China. But his antics were merely the most visible part of a larger sea change in which the bipartisan neoliberal consensus of ever-deepening ties with China gave way to a new bipartisan get-tough-with-China consensus. This turn went well beyond labor unions, environmentalists, and human rights activists and now includes the national security establishment (which is increasingly inclined to frame China as America’s leading global rival) and even corporate America (which has been disenchanted by China’s continued commitment to economic nationalism and state-directed enterprise).

As an erratic demagogue, Trump is dismissible. Far more worrying is the extremist rhetoric that became commonplace in his administration. This past July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered an alarming speech at the Richard Nixon Library that was a veiled but unmistakable call for regime change in China.

Joe Biden’s presidential campaign never challenged Trump’s saber-rattling on China. Rather, in a move that echoed John F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign accusing Nixon of being soft on the Soviet Union, Biden’s main line of attack was that Trump was too weak to stand up to Beijing. In April, the Biden campaign ran a TV ad arguing that, in praising the success of China’s coronavirus response early in the pandemic, “Trump rolled over for the Chinese. He took their word for it.” In July, Antony Blinken, since nominated by the president-elect as secretary of state, spoke at the hawkish Hudson Institute, claiming that “China, as a result of the last three and a half years, is in a stronger position [because of Trump], and we’re in a weaker position.” Blinken argued that a Biden administration would have to work to strengthen the United States for competition with China

As Biden unveils his foreign policy team, it’s clear that Blinken represents the new generation of China hawks in the Democratic Party. Jake Sullivan, the incoming national security adviser, is another. In a May 2020 article for the Foreign Policy website (coauthored with the historian Hal Brands), Sullivan argues that China is “pursuing global dominance.”

Michèle Flournoy, initially floated as a possible secretary of defense, wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in June 2020 arguing that the US military had to be strengthened so it could “credibly threaten to sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours.” Even though she wasn’t nominated, Flournoy continues to command respect in Democratic foreign policy circles. Other prominent China hawks in the running for senior policy positions include Jeffrey Prescott, Ely Ratner, and Kelly Magsamen.

There’s every reason to believe that Biden will have more China hawks setting policy in his administration than any president since Lyndon B. Johnson. What makes them all the more dangerous is that they present their arguments in mainstream and even progressive terms that could win a wider popular legitimacy than Trump’s xenophobia.

For progressives, the rise of the Democratic Party’s China hawks poses a real dilemma. On the one hand, there’s no reason to be nostalgic for an economic order that hurt labor, the environment, and human rights. The end of the neoliberal consensus opens up possibilities for refashioning the global trading order in a spirit closer to Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren than George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

Yet trade is only one dimension of the relationship. The China hawks around Biden also see the Asian superpower as a military rival that must be thwarted. The question facing progressives is whether it’s possible to work with them on areas of agreement, like trade, while also resisting a new Cold War in Asia.

One reason to fear the new China hawks is that they habitually engage in the type of hyperbolic rhetoric that has often been a prelude to shooting wars. China has the world’s largest population and second-largest economy, but it remains very much a regional military power with a global economic sway, not an aspiring global leviathan. In terms of military bases, cultural reach, and alliance systems, China is nowhere near being able to challenge the United States. All the potential flashpoints between China and the West involve either internal human rights problems or disputed territories that have historically been within China’s sphere of influence: Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Uighurs of Xinjiang, and islands in the South China Sea.

Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of government at Cornell University, tells me that for a Biden administration, “the most difficult issues are going to be in the realm of human rights and Taiwan. These are issues over which the Chinese Communist Party feels very strongly. It is concerned fundamentally about the security of the regime. Threats to national sovereignty are ones where the Chinese Communist Party has basically brooked no opposition. Chinese efforts around the world have really been designed to intimidate dissent on these issues.”

It’s important to understand how tightly circumscribed by “national sovereignty” China’s ambitions are. This is not to deny that these are important issues on which outside nations have a right, and sometimes a duty, to rebuke China. Still, they are all within what we can recognize as China’s national ambit.

Yet to hear the US national security establishment talk, China aspires to world conquest. And it’s not just the Trumpian right: Robert Gates, the secretary of defense under George W. Bush and Obama, is a pillar of the national security establishment. In his new book, Exercise of Power, Gates argues that Deng Xiaoping, who presided over the economic opening of China to American capitalism, had the “objective of unchallenged Chinese dominance in Asia and someday matching and then overtaking the United States in terms of global power.”

Gates lists the Chinese initiatives currently worrying the national security establishment: muscle-flexing in the South China Sea, the Belt and Road Initiative (an ambitious project to build a continent-spanning infrastructure linking China to Europe and Africa), and the robust use of loans and foreign aid to win friends in the Global South. This sort of dollar diplomacy is, of course, no different from what the United States and other Western nations practice. The only novelty is seeing an Asian nation engaged in great-power politics. Gates also seems anxious about the achievements of Chinese high tech, which he credits with “cloning a monkey—and a human.” In fact, no nation has yet cloned a human. But China’s rise keeps policy-makers like Gates awake at night nursing Dr. Moreau fantasies.

In the March-April 2018 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner argue that with China, “Washington now faces its most dynamic and formidable competitor in modern history.” Sullivan and Brands come to a similar conclusion, claiming that China is in many ways a more serious adversary than the Soviet Union, which “never had the ability, or the sophistication, to shape global norms and institutions in the way that Beijing may be able to do.”

Progressive advocates of foreign policy restraint reject this portrait of China as an existential threat to the United States. They note that the main issues of contention with China are in Asia, not all over the world. Progressives ask whether America needs to remain a hegemon in Asia—a legacy of World War II that seems increasingly anachronistic given the rise not just of China but of other, more democratic nations in the region.

“These two powers are jostling for influence,” Stephen Wertheim of the Quincy Institute tells me, “and China clearly has gotten significantly stronger in its own region in military terms, which to my mind doesn’t threaten the US as such but does threaten the US pursuit of military primacy in East Asia. And that’s why there was such a fuss about China’s claims in the South China Sea.” He adds, “For many political leaders in Washington, it’s OK for the United States to have a sphere of influence that is global. It’s not OK for China to have a sphere of influence that is regional.”

Daniel Bessner, who teaches US foreign policy at the University of Washington, acknowledges that China is a “rampant human rights abuser” but thinks the proper Western response is to open immigration for the Uighurs and for citizens of Hong Kong. These immigrants could be provided with the capital needed to resettle. This is much more likely to be effective than human rights lectures.

“I don’t think the US should retreat without a plan,” Bessner adds. “The United States is simply not going to fight World War III over Taiwan. My goal would be to foster a security transition where the United States helps regional allies like South Korea and Japan to achieve capabilities that allow them to defend themselves from Chinese expansionism. My major philosophical point is that the countries and states [in the region] have a better sense of what’s going on and have much bigger capabilities to decide what to do than the United States.”

Yet foreign policy analysts closer to the China hawks reject the notion that the United States could offload responsibilities to South Korea or Japan. Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution asks whether Japan going nuclear or becoming more nationalistic would really be a positive development. He argues that an American withdrawal from the region, however calibrated and gradual, will be destabilizing.

But even if we accept the argument that it’s in the United States’ best interests to remain an Asian power indefinitely, such a decision only underscores how limited China’s ambitions are. Its attempt to carve out a sphere of influence in Asia is perfectly normal great-power behavior, especially in light of its size and its history in the region. Far from being the Frankenstein monster of Nixon’s imagination or the would-be world dictator feared by the hawks, China is an ordinary great power. The question remains why so many policy-makers want to inflate it as a threat.

A rising China is the convenient foil needed by the American elite to hold its own increasingly divided nation together. In retrospect, World War II and the Cold War were powerful structuring experiences that helped subsume national divisions. Since the end of the Cold War, the American consensus has been fraying, with the brief exception of a few years after 9/11. Increased political polarization has in turn led to gridlock.

China hawks often talk about how the Chinese government sees America as a nation in crisis. As Campbell and Ratner note in their Foreign Affairs article, “This strategic distraction has given China the opportunity to press its advantages, further motivated by the increasingly prominent view in China that the United States (along with the West more broadly) is in inexorable and rapid decline. Chinese officials see a United States that has been hobbled for years by the global financial crisis, its costly war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deepening dysfunction in Washington.”

It’s possible that the China hawks share this bleak assessment of American prospects but hope a new Cold War with China might help reverse the decline. Bessner says, “I see the turn to China as a result of the failure [of the] Global War on Terror to actually construct an enemy appreciably existential enough to justify the continuation of all these structures. China is the existential threat du jour.”

In the September/October 2020 issue of Foreign Affairs, Campbell and Sullivan fantasize about a “Sputnik moment”:

The notion of a new “Sputnik moment”—one that galvanizes public research as powerfully as seeing the Soviet Union launch the world’s first satellite did—may be overstating the point, but government does have a role to play in advancing [US] economic and technological leadership. Yet the United States has turned away from precisely the kinds of ambitious public investments it made during that period—such as the Interstate Highway System championed by President Dwight Eisenhower and the basic research initiatives pushed by the scientist Vannevar Bush—even as it faces a more challenging economic competitor. Washington must dramatically increase funds for basic science research and invest in clean energy, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and computing power. At the same time, the federal government should scale up its investments in education at all levels and in infrastructure, and it should adopt immigration policies that continue to enhance the United States’ demographic and skills advantage. Calling for a tougher line on China while starving public investments is self-defeating; describing these investments as “socialist,” given the competition, is especially ironic. Indeed, such strange ideological bedfellows as Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, are making a convincing case for a new U.S. industrial policy.

This is perhaps the final and most powerful temptation of the China hawks, a dream that even some progressives might fall prey to: that China can serve as the convenient enemy America needs, a foe serious enough to rally the nation. Gridlock in Washington would end, opening the way for much-needed spending on infrastructure and education. As in the Cold War, battles over culture would be subsumed under the imperatives of national unity.

This fantasy, of course, is based on a rosy depiction of Cold War America. Just as the original Cold War ushered in McCarthyism and Cointelpro, it’s not hard to imagine a new Cold War fueling its own instances of horrific xenophobia—some of which we’ve already seen in the scapegoating of Asian Americans during the pandemic.

If the more militarized forms of China hawkishness can and should be rejected, that still leaves genuine areas of dispute. The draconian national security law imposed on Hong Kong and China’s ruthless suppression of its Uighur population are among the major human rights crimes of our time. As Jessica Chen Weiss notes, these are areas where, “unfortunately, the US and other external actors have relatively little leverage. I think you’ll see a prospective Biden administration doing more to draw attention to these concerns, but hopefully without leading to the same kinds of veiled or not-so-veiled calls for regime change in China.”

Tobita Chow, the director of Justice Is Global, worries that “very valid concerns around human rights are being weaponized by the national security hawks and turned into a rationale for this new Cold War style of politics.” Under Trump, Hong Kong became the “site of a proxy struggle,” with the United States using it “to build anti-China nationalism” and President Xi Jinping using it “to build anti-Western nationalism.”

“These two things are mirror images of each other,” he adds, arguing that an aggressive stance on China will only polarize the relationship in a way that supports the reactionary forces on both sides.

#### American images of China and US-China policy are mutually reinforcing. Their ideas lay the terrain of foreign policy and enable the articulation and protection of American identity.

Oliver Turner 14, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, *American Images of China: Identity, power, policy*, 2014, p 5-9.

The aff can’t no link this---politics and images of China are mutually reinforcing. The significance of material forces are contingent on the ideas that give those forces meaning---

As examined in Chapter 1, the relevant literatures have commonly neglected to inform upon the significance of historical and contemporary American images of China to US foreign policy towards that country. It is argued here that the former have always been inextricable from every stage of the formulation, enactment and justification of the latter. US China policy, in other words, has consistently been enabled and legitimised by powerful images which have worked to determine the boundaries of political possibility. As already noted, this analysis shifts from a concern with the types of ‘why’ questions that have been so frequently posed in the past, to ‘how’ questions which provide new avenues of exploration. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular policies and practices can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.10 For example, why did nineteenth-century American traders support the British in their conflicts with China, and why did their government subsequently seek a treaty with the Chinese? ‘How’ questions, meanwhile, investigate the production of identity and the ways in which this process ensures that selected practices can be enacted while others can be precluded.11 For example, how could a self-proclaimed anti-imperialist nation engage in ostensibly imperialist policies towards China in the nineteenth century and consider those policies legitimate? This book does not make claims of cause and effect, of causal linkages between imagery and action. Rather, it is understood that the power of imagery lies primarily in its ability to circulate and become truth so that certain courses of policy are enabled whether its intended purpose was to facilitate action or not. As such, this book reveals the specific historical conditions within which US China policies have occurred through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.12 It argues that while the US has traditionally dominated its material relations of power with China through superior economic and military capabilities, it has also been dominant through the power of representations to establish truths about that country and its people and enact and legitimise policies accordingly. Material forces are therefore of core significance to this analysis. However, it is shown that the nature and degree of that significance has always been contingent upon particular ideas which give those forces meaning.

Crucially, it is argued that the types of comparatively more stable and enduring imagery described above have always proven more significant in this regard. The ‘anti-imperialist’ United States of the nineteenth century, for example, could justify imperialist practises towards Uncivilised China (as well as Opportunity China) during the opium wars because it was understood that it had to be brought into the civilised world. In the 1970s and 1980s Washington’s more conciliatory approach towards the PRC was similarly enabled principally by representations of a less uncivilised and less threatening China than had seemingly existed in the recent past. It is thus shown that key constructions of China have functioned in the service of policy not merely through an increasing prominence within American imaginations, but in some cases by virtue of their retreat. Moreover – and of key importance – it is demonstrated that twenty-first century US China policies frequently rely upon images which emerged and became established during the very earliest encounters between Americans and Chinese. 3 US China policy has always been active in the production and reproduction of imagery and in the reaffirmation of the identities of both China and the United States.

Chapter 1 shows that the key literatures have often neglected to show how US China policy itself is active within the dissemination of imagery. As already established, material forces are always attributed particular meanings and so acts of US China policy inevitably work to reproduce those meanings. Ultimately, they reaffirm the identities of both China and the United States. This was evident during the Cold War, for example, when Washington’s containment policy continually reinforced understandings of Uncivilised (and Threatening) China in relation to the more civilised United States. The texts of Washington’s containment strategy functioned within the production of imagery and in the reconfirmation of China’s foreignness, as the PRC was marginalised beyond the limits of the ‘free’ and ‘civilised’ world. The argument, then, is that US China policies reproduce the discourses which make China foreign and which operate to enable them in the first place.13 The cycle of separation and difference is perpetuated and American images of China and US China policy are exposed not merely as inextricable, but also as mutually reinforcing.

The Cold War containment of the PRC is an example of an episode which exposes a second, but interrelated, function of US China policy: the protection of American identity when threatened by that of China. This book shows that at moments when the identity of the United States has appeared most in danger, American foreign policy has worked to shield its most intrinsic values.14 China’s Cold War containment was designed primarily in response to the expansion of communism into Asia. However – and to reiterate – communism alone does not represent a physical threat. To a significant extent it was the representation of communist China as an immediate danger which meant that the identity of the United States itself had to be defended. Ultimately, US Cold War policies reproduced imagery of China as a ‘Red’ communist threat in order to secure the core values of the United States.

#### \*\*\*COVID has given Sinophobia new legitimacy. Its resurgence is sustained by biased Western discourses about the PRC that attempt to claim the moral high ground over Chinese anti-Black racism.

Flair Donglai Shi 20, completing his PhD in English and Comparative Literature at the University of Oxford and has been working at Warwick University as Associate Tutor in Translation and Cultures since 2018, “Sinophobia Will Never Be the Same after Covid-19,” <https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/10/19/sinophobia-will-never-be-the-same-after-covid-19/>

Material xenophobic violence is magnified---

Against an already-risen powerful PRC championing globalisation coupled with a much more authoritarian mode of domestic governance, the resurgence of Sinophobia following the Covid-19 outbreak has acquired new legitimacy through its integration into sophisticated layers involving international and inter-racial politics. If diasporic communities are serious about standing together with the foreign to tackle this new wave of Sinophobia, always starting the anti-racist conversation with ‘I was born here’ is counterproductive. The first step towards embracing the foreign is to become aware of the international aspects of racism involving political judgements against other countries. In the case of Sinophobia, the analyses of systemic racism should not be confined to the presentation of the sufferings of individual Chinese people living in the West but must be extended to the examination of biased Western discourses and images of the nation of China. In the rest of this essay, I describe and explain three prominent ideological slippery slopes that constitute this new post-Covid Sinophobia, which have made it increasingly difficult to separate Western anti-racist, anti-authoritarian discourses from their own Orientalist tendencies and effects.

The Wane of Western Triumphalism

Firstly, post-Covid Sinophobia has finally exposed the unproductive and hypocritical aspects of the dominant form of anti-PRC rhetoric built on the neo–Cold-War binary of democracy versus authoritarianism. As the ‘Coming Collapse of China’ thesis keeps collapsing year after year (Chang 2001, 2011, and 2020), Western triumphalism following the end of the Cold War has inevitably started to wane, being replaced with the increasing sense of unease and fear that the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian control will actually prove to be a working method of modernisation and development, eventually spilling over and contaminating the democratic ‘Free World’ (Human Rights Watch 2020).

From late January to mid-March, when most cases of Covid-19 were still confined to mainland China, numerous articles appeared in mainstream Western media lambasting Chinese authoritarianism and censorship as the cause of the outbreak (The Economist 2020; Tufekci 2020). Not only did they highlight the silencing of Dr Li Wenliang, they also criticised the unprecedented method of large-scale lockdown as ‘violating human rights’, continuously doubting its efficacy (Buckley et al. 2020; Eve 2020). The subtext was clear: Covid-19 would never have happened in the democratic West, and even if it did, it would have been handled much more effectively and humanely than it was in authoritarian China. Such positional superiority was taken for granted until the turn of events since March quickly proved the opposite. This is what Belinda Kong (2019, 380) terms ‘bio-Orientalism’, which had already manifested thoroughly during the SARS outbreak in 2003, when Western media and public discourses portrayed China as ‘the site of exotic and unhygienic culinary traditions as well as authoritarian secrecy, a lethal combination’ threatening to break ‘the boundary between first-world health and third-world contagion’. As Marius Meinhof (2020) points out in a poignant summary, such dominant bio-Orientalist discourses:

(1) perceived events through the framework of liberal/authoritarian, (2) read the outbreak as a proof of the inevitable failure of the non-liberal, (3) delegated the virus into the sphere of the authoritarian other, (4) muted Chinese voices by making all statements from within China suspicious: Official Chinese case numbers, death rates, reports on successful containment strategies—always there would be someone to suspect manipulation by the authoritarian regime, which made it difficult to act upon these information.

This bio-Orientalist Sinophobia’s unreflective totalisation of a preconceived anti-authoritarian ideology did a huge disservice to everyone living in Western societies, not just the Chinese diasporas. The blind faith in idealised versions of liberal democracy bolstered by this conjecture of the authoritarian Other has weakened Western vigilance against the virus, and in extreme cases, resulted in blatant racism that designates the virus as ‘only affecting people of the yellow race’ (Kang 2020; The Storm Media 2020). The complacency has also hampered much-needed scientific as well as political collaboration with China, and the unwillingness to take seriously Chinese methods of containing and treating the virus backfired in cataclysmic proportions (Zhang and Xu 2020).

Rejecting the authoritarian/democratic binary embedded in post-Covid Sinophobia does not mean that we cannot criticise the Chinese government’s policies and actions. On the contrary, a much more nuanced case-by-case method of critique is urgently needed in order to avoid distorting the purpose or effect of critique into self-indulgent mystification of Western superiority. In other words, to steer clear of such Sinophobic tendencies, we must constantly ask ourselves: are we critiquing China because we have the best interests of people in China at heart, or because we just want to make ourselves feel good that we are not Chinese or not living in China? Common Asian American reactions based on birthplace and political allegiance can hardly confront this sophisticated anti-authoritarian Sinophobia, and we must learn to defuse and re-appropriate the Othering nature of many of the dominant China-watching discourses in order to avoid traps of hypocrisy, which can be so enticing in their superficial tone of enlightenment and progressiveness.

Triangulations of Anti-racist Competitions

Secondly, post-Covid Sinophobia is not confined to the racial binary of white versus yellow anymore, and actively incorporates anti-Blackness into a complex triangulation of (anti-)racist competitions that set the postcolonial, progressive, and multicultural West apart from racist, backward, and monolithic China. In such a racial triangulation, the Chinese are often presented as trapped in the West’s own racist past without any historical contextualisation of their own history of contact with people of African descent. Put more simply, one of the popularised Sinophobic arguments is now this: not only are the Chinese very racist against Black people, their racism also manifests in abhorrent ways that we in the white-majority societies have long overcome.

### 1NC---!D---Economy

#### No correlation between economic decline and war.

Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”   
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

### 1NC---Turn---Bioterror

#### Growth-driven tech innovation proliferates and advances the technology necessary to conduct bioterrorism.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

Whatever the actual potential of these technologies, it is clear that a powerful technological imaginary exists among policy makers, technologists, and economists that contributes to an unshakeable faith in innovation and human ingenuity to solve the decoupling challenge. Degrowth proponents have so far mainly challenged this optimism by emphasizing the limited potential of renewable energy due to its intermittency and high land and raw material demands (e.g. Kallis, 2018). However, this may downplay the (at least theoretical) potential for convergent breakthroughs in nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and AI to vastly improve renewable energy efficiency and storage systems while designing new materials to substitute for depleting minerals (Diamandis and Kotler, 2014). More broadly, while degrowthers have to some extent considered individual FIR technologies (particularly AI and biotechnology) (e.g. Kallis, 2018; Kerschner et al., 2018), they have yet to address their convergent and mutually amplifying character, which leaves them vulnerable to the arguments of techno-optimists. Of course, the revolutionary promise of these technologies may fail to materialize, and, given the magnitude of the decoupling challenge, degrowth advocates are right to be skeptical. However, due to irreducible uncertainty combined with the ‘exponential’ and ‘revolutionary’ potential of the FIR (Schwab, 2017), even more rigorous critical assessments would always be insufficient in the eyes of the techno-optimists. Therefore, an alternative line of response should also be pursued: what if the FIR does succeed in decoupling economic growth from total environmental impact? What unintended consequences then might this give rise to?3 Dual-use technologies and the democratization of violence First, we must consider that all these are ‘dual-use technologies’, or technologies with potential both for economic productivity and violence. As Blum and Wittes (2015, p. 2) explain, these technologies are driving a trend referred to as the ‘democratization of violence’ in which the ‘destructive power once reserved to states is now the potential province of individuals’. Rather than simply a matter of creating new individual weapons, Blum and Wittes (2015, pp. 39, 7-8) emphasize that convergent FIR technologies are generating ‘whole technological fields – a series of breakthroughs in basic science and engineering’ that ‘generate creativity in their users to build and invent new things, new weapons, and new modes of attack’. And to compound the problem, while FIR technologies empower individuals to kill and provoke systemic chaos unlike any other time in history, they also empower states to monitor the minute details of private and public life and potentially constrict individual and collective freedoms, while the unprecedented threats enabled by these same technologies will likely reinforce governmental efforts to intensify securitization as deeply as is technologically feasible. Blum and Wittes summarize the emerging predicament as follows: How should we think about the relationship between liberty and security when we both rely on governments to protect us from radically empowered fellow citizens around the globe and also fear the power those same technologies give to governments? (Blum and Wittes, 2015, p. 13) Blum and Wittes do not consider how the earth system crisis will intersect with these threats, either as a positive or negative feedback. But it should be clear that, in a world of FIR-driven sustainability solutions, they would inevitably intensify, and it is thus necessary to consider what new problems and governmental responses they would engender.4 Without claiming to exhaustively describe the security risks created by the FIR, I will focus on three emerging areas of concern: biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization, and will then discuss how they may collectively generate a spiral of insecurity and securitization. Biotechnology and the emerging terrain of biosecurity To begin with biosecurity, both the promise and peril of biotechnology – particularly the still nascent field of synthetic biology – is its immense creative potential. As a recent report from the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) describes: synthetic biology is expected to (1) expand the range of what could be produced, including making bacteria and viruses more harmful; (2) decrease the amount of time required to engineer such organisms; and (3) expand the range of actors who could undertake such efforts. (NAS, 2018, p. 4) For example, manipulating DNA structures in microorganisms can make certain agents more virulent, improve their resistance to antibiotics and vaccines, make them less detectable by already limited surveillance systems, transform harmless microorganisms into deadly ones, and make pathogens more resilient to diverse atmospheric conditions, thus increasing their lifespan (Charlet, 2018; NAS, 2018). At present these capabilities remain limited and dependent on highly advanced techniques and laboratory equipment, which is why most experts believe there have to date been no mass casualty bioterror attacks (NAS, 2018). However, the NAS notes that improvements in synthesis technology have followed a ‘Moore’s Law–like’ curve for both reductions in costs and increases in the length of constructs that are attainable’, and that ‘these trends are likely to continue’ (NAS, 2018, pp. 18–19). Moreover, automated DNA synthesis techniques remove much of the time-consuming and technically difficult aspects of manipulating DNA, further reducing barriers to access (Wintle et al., 2017). And in the future, experts warn that ‘convergent capabilities’ between synthetic biology, information technology, nanotechnology, and 3D printing may enable ‘sudden’ breakthroughs in bioweaponization (e.g. by improving bio-agent stability and delivery, providing advance[d]s aerosolization capability, and accelerating the ‘Design-and-Build’ cycle) (NAS, 2018, p. 87). The possibilities of bio-weaponization will expand as these techniques diffuse, which are already enabling the formation of a ‘DIYbio’ movement in which amateur scientists, inventors, and others are increasingly ‘capable of doing at home what just a few years ago was only possible in the most advanced university, government or industry laboratories’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1109). The new CRIPSR/Cas9 gene editing technique further expands the range of genomic tinkering available to individuals, which has been widely embraced by the DIYbio community as a powerful tool that ‘makes it easy, cheap, and fast to move genes around – any genes, in any living thing’ (Maxmen, 2015). The capacities of DIY biohackers remain limited in important ways, though the trends described above suggests they will continue to increase as barriers to advanced bio-weaponization fall (NAS, 2018). And while the risks are evident, the democratization of these techniques may also facilitate the diffusion and customization of local solutions to environmental and health challenges while enhancing popular participation in the direction of biotechnological evolution away from transnational corporate dominance (Bennett et al., 2009). We can therefore say that these emerging technologies pose a unique kind of ‘security dilemma’: while their development and diffusion may strengthen local and global capacities to solve environmental challenges, they may also imperil global security by unleashing uniquely powerful and complex violence capabilities. Synthetic biology is only in its early stages, and governments from the UK to China aim to ‘accelerate [its] industrialization and commercialization’ in order ‘to drive economic growth’ and ‘develop solutions to key challenges across the bioeconomy, spanning health, chemicals, advanced materials, energy, food, security and environmental protection’ (Synthetic Biology Leadership Council, 2016, pp. 13, 4). If calls for emergency action to exponentially expand the green economy indeed accelerate these trends (Falk et al., 2018), then by 2030 (and more so by 2040) we will live in a world where genetically engineered biofuels dramatically increase, genetic tinkering with crop varieties is normalized to enhance agricultural resilience, and gene drives are deployed to control old and new disease vectors intensified by climate change (among other potential applications), which would exponentially expand the number of individuals with biotech expertise and access to the needed equipment. Therefore, while we have yet to experience a catastrophic bioterror attack, rapid advances in synthetic biology are nonetheless creating a ‘black swan waiting to happen’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1110), and the risk is that such black swans could become increasingly ‘normal’ if this technology becomes a key engine of economic growth and green technological innovation.

#### Extinction – terrorism, accidents, and rogue states.

Ord 20, research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, has advised the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the UK Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office (Toby, March 6th, "Why we need worst-case thinking to prevent pandemics,” *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/06/worst-case-thinking-prevent-pandemics-coronavirus-existential-risk)

We have seen the indirect ways that our actions aid and abet the origination and spread of pandemics. But what about cases where we have a much more direct hand in the process – where we deliberately use, improve or create the pathogens? Our understanding and control of pathogens is very recent. Just 200 years ago, we didn’t even understand the basic cause of pandemics – a leading theory in the west claimed that disease was produced by a kind of gas. In just two centuries, we discovered it was caused by a diverse variety of microscopic agents and we worked out how to grow them in the lab, to breed them for different traits, to sequence their genomes, to implant new genes and to create entire functional viruses from their written code. This progress is continuing at a rapid pace. The past 10 years have seen major qualitative breakthroughs, such as the use of the gene editing tool Crispr to efficiently insert new genetic sequences into a genome, and the use of gene drives to efficiently replace populations of natural organisms in the wild with genetically modified versions. This progress in biotechnology seems unlikely to fizzle out anytime soon: there are no insurmountable challenges looming; no fundamental laws blocking further developments. But it would be optimistic to assume that this uncharted new terrain holds only familiar dangers. To start with, let’s set aside the risks from malicious intent, and consider only the risks that can arise from well-intentioned research. Most scientific and medical research poses a negligible risk of harms at the scale we are considering. But there is a small fraction that uses live pathogens of kinds that are known to threaten global harm. These include the agents that cause the Spanish flu, smallpox, Sars and H5N1 or avian flu. And a small part of this research involves making strains of these pathogens that pose even more danger than the natural types, increasing their transmissibility, lethality or resistance to vaccination or treatment. In 2012, a Dutch virologist, Ron Fouchier, published details of an experiment on the recent H5N1 strain of bird flu. This strain was extremely deadly, killing an estimated 60% of humans it infected – far beyond even the Spanish flu. Yet its inability to pass from human to human had so far prevented a pandemic. Fouchier wanted to find out whether (and how) H5N1 could naturally develop this ability. He passed the disease through a series of 10 ferrets, which are commonly used as a model for how influenza affects humans. By the time it passed to the final ferret, his strain of H5N1 had become directly transmissible between mammals. The work caused fierce controversy. Much of this was focused on the information contained in his work. The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity ruled that his paper had to be stripped of some of its technical details before publication, to limit the ability of bad actors to cause a pandemic. And the Dutch government claimed that the research broke EU law on exporting information useful for bioweapons. But it is not the possibility of misuse that concerns me here. Fouchier’s research provides a clear example of well-intentioned scientists enhancing the destructive capabilities of pathogens known to threaten global catastrophe. Of course, such experiments are done in secure labs, with stringent safety standards. It is highly unlikely that in any particular case the enhanced pathogens would escape into the wild. But just how unlikely? Unfortunately, we don’t have good data, due to a lack of transparency about incident and escape rates. This prevents society from making well-informed decisions balancing the risks and benefits of this research, and it limits the ability of labs to learn from each other’s incidents. Security for highly dangerous pathogens has been deeply flawed, and remains insufficient. In 2001, Britain was struck by a devastating outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in livestock. Six million animals were killed in an attempt to halt its spread, and the economic damages totalled £8bn. Then, in 2007, there was another outbreak, which was traced to a lab working on the disease. Foot-and-mouth was considered a highest-category pathogen, and required the highest level of biosecurity. Yet the virus escaped from a badly maintained pipe, leaking into the groundwater at the facility. After an investigation, the lab’s licence was renewed – only for another leak to occur two weeks later. In my view, this track record of escapes shows that even the highest biosafety level (BSL-4) is insufficient for working on pathogens that pose a risk of global pandemics on the scale of the Spanish flu or worse. Thirteen years since the last publicly acknowledged outbreak from a BSL-4 facility is not good enough. It doesn’t matter whether this is from insufficient standards, inspections, operations or penalties. What matters is the poor track record in the field, made worse by a lack of transparency and accountability. With current BSL-4 labs, an escape of a pandemic pathogen is only a matter of time. One of the most exciting trends in biotechnology is its rapid democratisation – the speed at which cutting-edge techniques can be adopted by students and amateurs. When a new breakthrough is achieved, the pool of people with the talent, training, resources and patience to reproduce it rapidly expands: from a handful of the world’s top biologists, to people with PhDs in the field, to millions of people with undergraduate-level biology. The Human Genome Project was the largest ever scientific collaboration in biology. It took 13 years and $500m to produce the full DNA sequence of the human genome. Just 15 years later, a genome can be sequenced for under $1,000, and within a single hour. The reverse process has become much easier, too: online DNA synthesis services allow anyone to upload a DNA sequence of their choice then have it constructed and shipped to their address. While still expensive, the price of synthesis has fallen by a factor of 1,000 in the past two decades, and continues to drop. The first ever uses of Crispr and gene drives were the biotechnology achievements of the decade. But within just two years, each of these technologies were used successfully by bright students participating in science competitions. Such democratisation promises to fuel a boom of entrepreneurial biotechnology. But since biotechnology can be misused to lethal effect, democratisation also means proliferation. As the pool of people with access to a technique grows, so does the chance it contains someone with malign intent. People with the motivation to wreak global destruction are mercifully rare. But they exist. Perhaps the best example is the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, active between 1984 and 1995, which sought to bring about the destruction of humanity. It attracted several thousand members, including people with advanced skills in chemistry and biology. And it demonstrated that it was not mere misanthropic ideation. It launched multiple lethal attacks using VX gas and sarin gas, killing more than 20 people and injuring thousands. It attempted to weaponise anthrax, but did not succeed. What happens when the circle of people able to create a global pandemic becomes wide enough to include members of such a group? Or members of a terrorist organisation or rogue state that could try to build an omnicidal weapon for the purposes of extortion or deterrence? The main candidate for biological existential risk in the coming decades thus stems from technology – particularly the risk of misuse by states or small groups. But this is not a case in which the world is blissfully unaware of the risks. Bertrand Russell wrote of the danger of extinction from biowarfare to Einstein in 1955. And, in 1969, the possibility was raised by the American Nobel laureate for medicine, Joshua Lederberg: “As a scientist I am profoundly concerned about the continued involvement of the United States and other nations in the development of biological warfare. This process puts the very future of human life on earth in serious peril.”

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#### Fiat DA — Their model forwards a broken approach to political organizing, assuming the government will listen if we just ask them nicely. That reifies neoliberal logics and state control — only the alt proposes a clear road map for breaking down neoliberalism.

Quinn 16, Canadian writer and comedian based in London (R.J., December 10th, “Can I Talk to a Manager?” *Jacobin Magazine*, <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/12/liberalism-brexit-donald-trump>, Accessed 08-24-2021)

If Guy Debord were alive today, he might say that “in societies where the neoliberal conditions of political economy prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of customer service interactions.” That is, to the liberal, all relationships are business transactions.

Nowhere is this tendency more apparent than in the contemporary liberal approach to political organizing, which seems to be reducible to a great cry of “Can I speak to a manager?” And nowhere was it better exemplified than in early October, when several thousand middle-class dog owners marched through central London to protest Brexit. Yet another outgrowth of the “People’s Vote” campaign (which is pushing for a redo of the Brexit referendum), the demonstration was called the “Wooferendum.”

The ur-concept of contemporary liberal politics is faith in the authority of a rule-governed order, and an expectation that the appointed minders of that rule-governed order will operate society, more or less, as a service to those who pay for it. In other words, “Excuse me, I do not mean to cause a fuss, but I’m not entirely satisfied.”

In the two years since its vote to leave the European Union, the UK has seen innumerable marches on parliament advancing the demand that the government cancel Brexit, or at least offer a People’s Vote. These marches, proudly unaffiliated with a political tendency, and frequently tinged with rhetoric suggesting that the Brexit vote was enabled by provincial rubes or spending skulduggery, have been an exhortation to the government of the day to just act, please. They are billed as marches politicians “cannot ignore,” that politicians have gone on to ignore. The political theory of change used by The Wooferendum, and others like it, is that once displeasure is voiced by enough people, the powerful — be they billionaires, political leaders, or whoever else — will then graciously remove the offending policy.

This phenomenon, of course, is hardly confined to the United Kingdom. In the United States, the years since Donald Trump’s election have been marked by a liberal obsession with the prospect of a released tax return or well-placed confession extracted by special counsel Robert Mueller to get rid of him. Just act, please.

“Speaking to the manager” is a sort of tyrannical helplessness; it is the haughty demand for intercession on one’s behalf by an array of greater forces you assume are servile. It is worded like a demand, but it is in fact a plea. It relies on a deeply held belief that society has been ordered for your benefit, because you bought it. And by repeatedly reminding those in charge that society is not entirely to your liking, a number of dutiful institutions or solicitous political Jeeveses will course correct and bring things “back to normal.”

It also assumes a hierarchical society, ordered like a restaurant: some eat, some serve, and there is a manager to keep it all going. This is why these same liberals tend to find the prospect of greater popular control over the media, economy, or society chilling, because they must confront the possibility that they will no longer be served and tended to.

We have been conditioned by the market to believe “the customer is always right.” But the power the customer holds over a business is a thin simulacrum of power. Power is classically understood as the ability to compel others to do what, but for you, they would not have done. Yet “consumer” power relies on businesses doing what customers say when it is in their interest to do so. The human construed as a customer can pull but one lever for change: “no.” The customer can decline to purchase, even voice displeasure, but the role of customer is inherently passive.

#### Healthcare commodification is ethically bankrupt—the aff should be rejected a-priori for subscribing to this logic

Pellegrino 99 - M.D., John Carroll Professor of Medicine and Medical Ethics, Center for Clinical Bioethics, Georgetown University Medical Center

Edmund D., The Commodification of Medical and Health Care: The Moral Consequences of a Paradigm Shift from a Professional to a Market Ethic, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1999, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 243–266

Much more important than the economic short-comings of the managed care line of reasoning and operation are the ethical issues encompassed in the paradigm shift from a profession to a market ethic. Before examining these, it is necessary to see whether health and medical care are, in fact, commodities. If they are, then the managed care line of reasoning is essentially correct, and the present short-comings should yield to instrumental manipulation. But, if they are not commodities, then instrumental manipulation will not cure the present ills. Attention will have to turn to the ends and purposes of medicine, to healing as a special kind of human activity governed by an ethic that serves those ends and not the self-interests of physicians, insurance plans, or investors.¶ The legitimacy of the marketplace, competition, and democratic capitalism, therefore, are not at issue. Rather, the ethical question commodification raises is whether the marketplace is the proper instrument for the distribution of health care. Specifically, is health care sufficiently different from pantyhose, ocean-front condominiums, or television sets to set it apart from other consumer goods? The answer to this question rests on what we mean by a “commodity” (Zoloth-Dorfman and Rubin, 1995; Anderson, 1990; Immersheim and Lestes, 1996; Reynolds, 1995; Anderson, 1996).¶ The Oxford English Dictionary gives a wide range of meanings to the word “commodity”(OED Vol. II, 1961, p. 687). The definition most relevant to this discussion is the way the word is used in commerce, i.e., thing produced for sale valued for its usefulness to the consumer or its satisfaction of his preferences. Implicit in this definition is the idea of fungibility, namely, that one health care encounter is like any other, just like any bag of beans of same weight and quality is like any other bag of beans. It follows also on this view that, providing they are equally competent, any physician is like any other, and any patient like any other. Hospitals, laboratories, and nursing homes are all interchangeable as well.¶ If health care is a commodity, then it is something we possess and can sell, trade, or give away at our free will. This implies that, like any commodity, ownership of medical knowledge upon which health care depends resides with health professionals or those who employ or invest in them (Nozick, 1974, p.160; Engelhardt, 1996, p.381). No one else can lay claim to their medical knowledge or skill unless they were acquired unjustly. In this view, there would be no duty of stewardship over medical knowledge which would require its use on behalf of those who need it but cannot pay for it. Nor can there be any valid moral claim by the sick on society for its allocation or distribution. Whether health care is a commodity in this sense will be discussed below as will the moral implications for the justice of moral claims in the allocation of resources.¶ The commodification question centers on “health care” not on the facilities, medications, instruments, dressings, and other disposable items used in or necessary to health care. These are, in one sense, commodities, since they can be owned, consumed, bought, traded, and donated. They are in a different category from commodities unrelated to health care. To a large extent, they must be subject to market forces. But in the interests of the common good, they become the subject of ethical and public concern when their scarcity threatens human well-being. The sale of body parts, kidneys, or blood is another instance of commodification with serious ethical implications (Titmuss, 1997; Brecher, 1991). Granted the importance of all the objects that are essential in health care, the central ethical issue is the quality and nature of personal relationships involved. The materials used are means to the end of healing and helping sick persons.¶ By “health care,” therefore, I mean the provision of assistance to persons in need of care, cure, education, prevention, or help related to trauma, illness, disease, disability or dysfunction by other persons knowledgeable and skillful in providing such assistance. The central feature of health care is the personal relationship between a health professional and a person seeking help (Ray, 1987; Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1987). Commodities may be used in the process of providing care, but the totality of health care itself is not a commodity.¶ The most common assertion of those who see no objection against classifying health and medical care as commodities is that there is nothing unique about them as human activities. It is an assertion made usually by healthy people, the young and those who have not thought much about their own vulnerability and finitude. To be fair, there are undoubtedly a few people who steadfastly hold to this view despite everything, even when they themselves, or members of their families, become ill. Still, even they might reexamine that position at the moment when some dear family member is denied access to life-saving or life-enhancing treatments because of the fortuitous operations of the marketplace.¶ This is happening, today, in communities where hospitals are closing emergency rooms, burn units, premature baby care centers, and neonatal intensive care units to cut losses or to enhance profits (Kilborn, 1997). As a result, important care is not available or is so inconvenient or delayed that danger or death might occur. Acute care of this type is a need that may occur anywhere, anytime, and to anyone. If there is a first priority, this surely is one since other needs become insignificant until the emergency is over.¶ The same can be said for less dramatic medical and health care services. Human flourishing can and does occur in the presence of chronic illness, but it is certainly more easily attained when one is healthy. Chronic illness, pain, discomfort, or disability can constrain the most determined and best-adjusted person. For most people, it is difficult or impossible to do the things they want to do or enjoy when they are afflicted by illness. Health is a fundamental requirement for the fulfillment of the human potential and freedom to act and direct one’s life. To lack health and to need treatment is to be in a diminished state of human existence — a state quite unlike other deprivations which can be borne if one is healthy.¶ Serious illness changes our perceptions of ourselves as persons. It forces us to confront the fragility of our own existence. Human finitude is no longer a distinct abstraction, but something illness forces us to confront as a possible present reality. Regardless of whether the illness is serious, if we wish to be treated, we are forced to seek help, to invite and authorize a stranger — the health professional — to probe the secret places of body, mind, and soul. Without this scrutiny, we cannot be helped. To be sure, lawyers are permitted access to some intimate secrets, tax advisors to others, and ministers to still others. But only the physician may need access to the widest range of secrets, since being ill is not confined to the body. It is a disturbance in the whole life-world of the patient.¶ What the sick person needs is healing, i.e., a restoration of what has been “lost,” a reestablishment of the equilibrium that existed before the onset of illness. This “restoration” is not just a return of biological equilibrium (Gadamer, 1996). It is rather a restructuring of our whole life world — one with its unique history, set of relationships, and social milieu. In that restoration, there is a meshing of the life and lived worlds of both the doctor and the patient (Pellegrino, in press). Healing is achieved by a combination of the physician’s biological interventions (drugs, surgery, manipulations) with the healing power of the patient’s own body. In the end, where self-healing and medical healing begin and end may be highly problematic, but in either case, the assistance of knowledgeable health professionals is indispensable.¶ Given the special nature of illness and healing, health care cannot be a commodity. Health care is not a product which the patient consumes and which the doctor produces out of materials of one kind or another. The sick person “consumes” medication and supplies, and expends money for them, but he does not consume health “care” as he would a bag of beans or a six-pack of beer. Health or amelioration of disease may be the end of medicine but health, itself, is not a weighable commodity.¶ In a commodity transaction, like buying bread, the persons who buy and who sell have no personal interest in each other beyond the transaction. They are focused on the object or product, on the commodity to be traded. Their relationship does not extend beyond the sale or the consumption of that commodity. The medical relationship, in contrast, is intensely personal. Confidence and trust are crucial as is a continuing relationship, at least in general medicine if not in the subspecialties.¶ There are other intimate professional relationships as well as medicine. But, even in such intimate services as legal or ministerial advice, the sheer totality of engagement with the biological as well as the psycho-social and spiritual, which occurs in medicine, is lacking. This is not to depreciate these other crucial human services. They, too, respond to fundamental human needs: the lawyer to the need for justice; the minister to the need for spiritual reconciliation. Those are human needs of such fundamental significance for human flourishing that they, too, cannot be classified as commodities. However, the universality, unpredictability, inevitability, and intimate nature of the assault of illness on our humanity, the impediments it generates to human flourishing, and the intimate and personal nature of healing give health care a special place even among the helping professions.¶ Another feature of a commodity is that it is proprietary. Commodities are produced by someone who makes something new out of preexisting materials. The seller herself, or her agent, owns the goods or commodities she offers for sale. For a price, she transfers ownership to the buyer who consumes the product as he wishes. This is not, and cannot be, the nature of the case with medical or health care. Physicians, nurses, and other health professionals are not the sole owners of their medical knowledge for several good reasons.¶ For one thing, the physician’s knowledge comes from many years — and in some cases, centuries — of clinical observations recorded by his or her predecessors. All health professionals have free access to that record across national boundaries. In addition, the most reliable, clinically pertinent medical knowledge comes from autopsies or controlled experiments on other human beings. A research “break-through” often results in response to previous work. The investigator uses instruments and methods discovered by others. No research exists in a vacuum. The fruits of research also result from the willingness of our fellow citizens to be research subjects so that others might benefit. Biomedical research is funded by public agencies or by private philanthropies to which all contribute by paying taxes or purchasing products from whose profits the funds for philanthropy derive.¶ Moreover, the doctor’s education depends upon the acquisition of a kind of knowledge and experience which is ethically possible only with society’s sanction (Pellegrino, 1995). In their first years, for example, medical students dissect human cadavers for which they would be criminally prosecuted without social sanction. Later, they are allowed to participate in the care of patients when they are incompletely trained, albeit under supervision of licensed practitioners. Students can only learn procedures and operations by “practice,” again, under supervision. They participate in clinical care when, clearly, their skills are rudimentary. They continue to enjoy this privilege in their post-graduate years as residents or fellows.¶ Society sanctions these practices because the only way future physicians can be trained properly is by “hands-on” experience. Physicians in practice continue to enjoy these privileges in continuing education which is designed to maintain their skills or teach them new procedures. Surgeons develop and maintain their skills by continuing “practice,” at first under supervision and, later, independently.¶ The argument has been made that medical knowledge is proprietary because it has been paid for by tuition and continuing education fees and by the many years of study and demanding work required for a thorough medical education (Sade, 1971). But even this cannot make medical knowledge proprietary. There is no fee that could buy the privileges or waive the legal penalties that would be imposed if medical students, residents, and fellows did not have social sanction for what they are allowed to do. Moreover, these privileges are accorded not primarily so that doctors or nurses may have a means of livelihood or an “edge” in competing with their fellows. The privilege of medical and nursing education are permitted in exchange for the benefits society accrues from the assurance of a continuing supply of well-trained physicians and other health professionals.¶ As a result, when they accept the privilege of a medical education, medical and nursing students enter implicitly into a covenant with society to use their knowledge for the benefit of the sick. By entering this covenant, they become stewards rather than proprietors of the knowledge they acquire. Their fees and labor entitle them to charge for their personal services – not because they own the knowledge they employ, but because of the effort and time they invest and the danger they may incur in applying that knowledge to particular persons. They are entitled to compensation for their effort. But, to paraphrase Plato, they are true physicians when they are healers first, and moneymakers second (Plato, Republic 341c).¶ COMMODIFICATION, MARKET ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS¶ Clearly, health and medical care do not fit the conceptual mode of commodities. They center too much on universal human needs which are much more fundamental to human flourishing than any commodity per se. They depend on highly intimate personal inter-relationships to be effective. They are not objects fashioned and owned by health professionals, nor are they consumed by patients like other commodities. Stewardship is a better metaphor than proprietorship for medical knowledge and skill.¶ All of this might be granted and still some might hold that, even if health and medical care are not commodities in the usual sense, they should be treated as such. In this view, the market is the best mechanism in a free society for the distribution of health care like all human goods. It is the best guarantor of those special aspects of health and medical care we have insisted must be preserved. When consumers are free to choose and providers compete, the interests of all will be better served, especially when costs are high, quality among providers is variable, and resources are scarce.¶ Let us examine the consequences of such assertions from the point of view of their ethical meaning for persons who are ill and for society in general.¶ The most immediate and urgent ethical consequences of commodification occur at the bedside at the moment of actual decision-making. Here the major issues are divided loyalty, conflicts of interest, conflicts with the traditional ethic of medicine, and challenges to the personal integrity of physicians and nurses. These conflicts have been examined in some detail elsewhere (Pellegrino, 1997; Rodwin, 1995; Rodwin, 1996; and McArthur and Moore, 1997). The focus here will be on commodification and commercialization of the healing relationship and the supplanting of the traditional professional ethic by the ethic of the market and of business.¶ First of all, the commodification of health and medical care means that the transaction between physicians and patients has become a commercial relationship. That relationship, therefore, will be primarily or solely regulated by the rules of commerce and the laws of torts and contracts rather than the precepts of professional ethics. Profit-making and pursuit of selfinterest will be legitimated. Inequalities in distribution of services and treatments are not the concerns of free markets. Denial of care for patients who could not pay were not unknown in the past. But they were not legitimated as they are in a free market system where patients are expected to suffer the consequences of a poor choice in health care plans, or a decision to go uninsured or to pay only for a plan with lesser levels of coverage. In this view, inequities are unfortunate but not unjust (Engelhardt, 1996). Some simply are losers in the natural and social lottery (Nozick, 1974). The market ethos does not per se foreclose altruism, but neither does it impose a moral duty to help, especially if helping impinges on the proprietary rights of others without their consent.¶ In a market-driven economy, commodities are fungible, i.e., any one of them can be substituted for any other similar commodity, provided quality and price are the same. In this view of health care, physicians and patients become commodities, too (Zoloth-Dorfman and Rubin, 1995; Greenberg et al., 1989; Starr, 1982, p. 217). The identity of physicians, hospitals, clinic locations, and laboratories makes no difference unless a clear quality gap or danger is demonstrated. Patients, too, become fungible. They are “insured lives.” They can be traded and bargained for, back and forth, in mergers, network formation, or sales of hospitals and clinics. They are “profit” or “loss” centers, assets when they stay well and pay premiums, and debits if they become ill and need too many services (Greenberg et al., 1989). The “quality” of any group of patients is then measured by their profitability and this can be a “deal breaker” in mega-mergers, etc., when both doctor and patient become faceless counters in business mega-deals (Blecher, 1998).¶ When both doctors and patients are fungible, choice of physician has no ultimate weight despite repeated surveys showing it is the most important factor in the therapeutic relationship. Physicians no longer look on pa-tients as “theirs” in the sense that they feel a continuing responsibility for a given patient’s welfare. Without this attachment of particular doctors to particular patients, it is easy to justify a strict 9-5 workday, signing out to another doctor on short notice, or being “unavailable” for all those personal concerns and worries that beset patients even with non-life-threatening illnesses. Even short-term continuity of care is difficult to come by and, in any case, reckoned as not essential for care to be “delivered” (Flocke et al., 1997). Similarly, necessary communications between primary care physicians and specialists are hampered, further aggravating the discontinuity (Roulidis and Schulman, 1994).¶ To remedy this, patients are urged by the corporate ethos and the fungibility of physicians to regard the managed care organization as their “doctor.” The corporation will provide. The organization will deliver the commodity and make certain that “someone” is there to deliver it. Many physicians are already socialized into this corporate way of thinking. They place less emphasis on continuity, personal commitment, and personalized relationships with patients than in the past. Physicians who are corporate employees become encultured in an ethic alien to the professional (McArthur and Moore, 1997). The ethic of the marketplace and the ethic of the employee begin to displace the more demanding ethic of a profession. The ethic of individual patient welfare based on principles has moved towards greater dependence on the institutions providing care (Emanuel, 1995).¶ There is no room in a free market for the non-player, the person who can’t “buy in” — the poor, the uninsured, the uninsurable. The special needs of the chronically ill, the disabled, infirm, aged, and the emotionally distressed are no longer valid claims to special attention. Rather, they are the occasion for higher premiums, more deductibles, or exclusion from enrollment. There is no economic justification for the extra time required to explain, counsel, comfort, and educate these patients and their families since these cost more than they return in revenue.¶ Despite the boast about prevention under a managed care system, the time required for genuine behavioral change — the essential ingredient in true prevention — is not recompensed. To be sure, immunizations, diet sheets, smoking cessation clinics might be offered. They are not as costly nor as effective as the constant effort required for genuine behavior modification with reference to diet, exercise, stress control, and the like. Effective prevention requires education and counseling, and these are personnel-intensive and rarely profit-making.¶ The business ethos puts its emphasis on the bottom line, on profit, on an excess of revenue over expenses. The aim of business is to maximize returns to investors (Friedman, 1970). For-profit organizations return those profits to investors, executives, and board members. The care they provide turns out to be more expensive as well (Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 1997). Non-profit organizations use profits to expand services or to “survive” the intense competition that characterizes the health care “industry” today. But in both for-profit and non-profit systems, health professionals who contribute to the bottom line are valued; those who do not are devalued or let go (Kuttner, 1998, pp.1562-1563).¶ In a commodity transaction, the ethics of business replaces professional ethics. Business ethics is not to be depreciated. Many businesspeople genuinely seek to be “ethical.” A whole literature and a whole new set of experts in business ethics give testimony to a genuine interest in ethical business conduct in general and in health care in particular (Bowie and Duska, 1990; Blair, 1995; Evans, 1988; Shortell et al., 1996). Emphasis on worth creation rather than profit maximization and better representation of patient interest are promoted by ethically sensitive corporations.¶ The question, however, is not the validity of a business ethics, but whether it is appropriate for health and medical care. If there is any weight to the arguments for the special character of health care, then a business ethics is inappropriate and insufficient as a guide for health professionals. Revisions of business ethics are admirable, especially if they ameliorate some of the crasser aspects of for-profit plans. But the problems are of a more fundamental sort not susceptible to cure by changes in management ideology.¶ The contrasts between business and professional ethics are striking. Business ethics accepts health care as a commodity, its primary principle is non-maleficence, it is investor- or corporate-oriented, its attitude is pragmatic, and it legitimates self-interest, competitive edge, and unequal treatment based on unequal ability to pay. Professional ethics, on the other hand, sees health care not as a commodity but as a necessary human good, its primary principle is beneficence, and it is patient-oriented. It requires a certain degree of altruism and even effacement of self-interest.¶ When humans are at their most vulnerable and exploitable, they need much more secure protection than a business ethics can afford. Buying an automobile, for example, is a tricky business, to be sure. Much faith must be placed in the manufacturer and the salesperson (a slender reed, indeed). One hopes for an ethical dealer. But the vulnerability of the auto purchaser pales to insignificance when compared to entering an emergency room with a pain in the chest or a fractured skull.¶ The corrupting power of industrial and business metaphors has been commented upon elsewhere (Pellegrino, 1994). Suffice it to say that sub-stituting words like “consumers” for patients, “providers” for physicians, “commodities” for healing relationships, or speaking of health care as an “industry,” or of “product-lines” or investment opportunities” inevitably distorts the nature of healing and helping. Euphemisms, if repeated often enough, eventually will shape behavior as though they were true renditions of real world events and states of affairs.¶ If we treat health care as a commodity, then we are prone to “sell it” like any other commodity — that is, by creating a demand among those who can pay. Getting the competitive edge via advertising is standard commercial practice. The first move in this direction came in 1982 when the Federal Trade Commission decided that the then-standing AMA ethical prohibition against advertising constituted a restraint of trade (Federal Trade Commission, 1982). The Commission treated medicine as a business and not a profession. In effect, the Commission ordered the AMA to set its ethical code aside in the interests of commerce. The implications of such an action for the ethical integrity of the profession have not been sufficiently appreciated.¶ Since the FTC order, the ethos of the advertising world, with its all-toocharacteristic seductive promises and often-misleading inducements has dominated the promotion of health care in the media. In the name of competition, everything has become a “P.R.” problem and an exercise in spin-control. The claim that advertising provides information upon which consumers (patients) can base their choice of doctors or health plans is no less spurious than it is in the advertisement of cosmetics. Reliable, clear, unambiguous data on coverage and quality are hard to see through the camouflage and persiflage of marketing.¶ DOES COMMODIFICATION WORK?¶ Some might agree that treating health care as a commodity does, indeed, carry the ethical risks I have detailed above. However, they might insist that, commodity or not, health care is part of the economy, and it is best distributed in a free market. They can point effectively to the dismal failure of government-controlled markets in socialist economies of recent unhappy memory. They might argue that the benefits of a free market might outweigh the dangers. Three of these putative benefits are (1) cost savings which competition would effect, (2) the subscriber or “consumer’s” freedom to spend his or her money for health care as he or she wishes, and (3) the satisfaction the patient would enjoy as providers competed for his or her business. Let us examine these presumed benefits in the light of the realities as they are unfolding in managed care, which does, indeed, make health care a commodity and seeks to improve its distribution and price while retaining its quality via the workings of the market.¶ It is a fact that rationing and limitations on physician decisions have kept costs from escalating. But there are already clear evidences of a reverse trend (Smith, 1997; Anders, 1996). Premiums are rising in many states and promise to do so elsewhere. Profits are dropping. Initial savings through mergers, reductions of personnel or acquisitions, and tightened controls on physician decisions are one-time savings. Mergers may be as much signs of weakness as strength. Treating medical and health care as a commodity subject to market forces must face certain inescapable clinical realities.¶ For one thing, subscribers cannot all be, and remain, young and healthy forever. As subscribers age, they need and demand more services. As time goes by, initial promises to contain costs or to return a profit become more difficult to keep. Subscribers either must be dropped, selected out at the outset, or corners must be cut and quality endangered. When profits drop, investors in for-profit plans will sell and move to better opportunities; non-profit organizations will face bankruptcy, and for-profit plans will tighten approval requirements for care or for inclusion in the plan. Every plan will scramble to enroll young, healthy people who have little need for care. The poor, the under-insured, and the genuinely sick will be pariahs to be avoided or dis-enrolled in some way.¶ The promise of freedom of choice is even more illusory (Enthoven, 1980; Hertzlinger, 1997). For the largest majority of those insured, their employers (who are the purchasers of the plans) make the first choice — selection of a plan with which to contract for services. This is done primarily on the basis of cost, not of quality. Indeed, neither the employer nor the employee is in a good position to judge outcomes and quality of care except in the grossest terms. The fragility of these choices is manifest in the employer’s constant shifting from plan to plan for the “best” buy, which often translates into the cheapest buy. The employee has no choice but to go with the plan or go it alone and buy his or her own insurance.¶ Once in a plan, freedom is, again, limited — this time in choice of doctor. Yes, there is choice, as long as it is from the panel of approved physicians and a list of approved services. The same limitation on freedom prevails when it comes to choice of hospital, or specialist, or an MRI or lab facility. The advertisements proclaim “choice,” but all have fine print that limit those choices.¶ Even more uncertain is the choice of how best to spend one’s money in health care — whether to buy a plan with a high or low deductible, wheth-er to go naked and use one’s money for other things, and which of the complex and confusing array of “products” and “packages” best suits one’s health needs at one time of life or another. This illusory freedom flies in the face of realities like the difficulty, even for educated people — even health professionals — of comprehending what the convoluted obscurantist language of the contract covers or the impossibility of predicting how much coverage one will, in fact, need, particularly to meet the uncertainty of an unexpected catastrophic illness. Should one buy limited coverage? Should one opt for a high or a low deductible? How are changing needs to be accommodated — like being married, divorced, having children, retiring, choosing a medical savings account, or unexpectedly picking up the care of elderly parents? What do hospitals, physicians, and society do when those who make bad choices appear for care?¶ Libertarians might regale in this richness of choices. Yet, even they would have to admit that bad choices can be made by the most educated people. The libertarian could reply that this is the price of freedom: “Better than someone else making the choice! After all, some people do not value health care above other goods. They may wish to run the risk in order to be able to spend their earnings on more immediate needs or pleasures.” This is carrying caveat emptor to the extreme without resolving the question of what physicians do when the patient who made a poor choice presents himself or herself with a medical emergency or a serious illness.¶ In a market-driven ethos, theoretically at least, physicians would be justified in refusing care. They could argue that patients are responsible for their own health, that they must live with their choices, and that to provide care under those circumstances is to distribute other people’s wealth without their consent. This is a stark but unavoidable conclusion of a strictly libertarian view of property rights, health care, and social governance. Whether this conclusion is consistent with the most minimal rudiments of professional ethics or with a good or just society is highly debatable.¶ Many managed care plans measure their success in terms of consumer satisfaction. But the relationship between satisfaction and quality is a tenuous one. Consumer satisfaction is not the whole of health care. The genuine difficulties of measuring quality outcomes are vastly under-rated by the satisfaction criterion. The young, those who have not needed the system, or those who make low demands might very well be satisfied with lower premiums and some of the advertising slogans. This is much less the case with the chronically ill, the aged, and those who make demands on the system. Data are appearing that show these patients have poorer out-comes in managed care systems than in fee-for-service systems (Ware et al., 1996). Others go through the “revolving door,” leaving their capitated plan for Medicare and Medicaid coverage when they really become ill.¶ IF NOT A COMMODITY, WHAT IS HEALTH CARE?¶ If, as I have argued, health care is not a commodity, if the consequences of treating it as such are morally unpalatable, and if it is a special kind of human activity derived from a universal need of all humans when they become ill, how should it be treated in a just society? Here we enter the complex, much-debated field of distributive justice, in general and in health care, and the very practical issues of health care reform and policy. These large subjects are well beyond the scope of this essay. But, by arguing against the commodity notion and the market ethic, I incur a certain obligation to point to the direction in which a morally tenable answer might lie.¶ Buchanan (1987) has summarized the major theories of justice associated with the distribution of health care. He has done so with care and with a fair appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of each. In serial order, Buchanan examines the libertarian theories of Nozick (1974) and Engelhardt (1996), the contractarian views of Rawls (1971) and Daniels (1985), the egalitarianism of Veatch (1986) and Menzel (1983). These theories all depend on whether or not there is a right of the sick to health care, created by the unfortunate circumstance of illness. The limitation of rights and rights language in public life are receiving more attention (Glendon, 1991; Bellah et al., 1991). Rights-language focuses too often on the negative rights of freedom from coercion and not enough on obligation and duties. Given the vulnerable and dependent state of sick persons, it is not intrusion on rights they fear, but abandonment to their fates by their fellow humans. As a result, there is a growing interest in communitarian and common good conceptions of justice.¶ Buchanan includes a non-rights-based approach which contends, instead, that there is a duty in beneficence to aid the needy and those in distress. In this view, health care is a “collective good.” Government enforcement is necessary to ensure that this collective good is provided even to those who may not have a discernable “right” to it. In this approach, beneficence is given at least equal weight with justice, and the collective good at least as much weight as the individual good (Buchanan 1997, p. 358).¶ Another challenge to commodification is to regard medical and healthcare in a societal context as a public work, that is, as an “...organized medical response to illness in a social context and to the practice of caring in a community”(Jennings and Hanson, 1995, p. 8). This notion needs further fleshing out. While it intimates a connection with the idea of a common or civic good, it remains somewhat vague. Importantly, it does return our attention to the fundamental questions about the social ethics of health care.¶ I believe that the moves to a prima facie obligation of beneficence on behalf of the sick (Buchanan, 1997) or the practice of caring in a community (Jennings and Hanson, 1995) are in the right direction. For a morally defensible policy of health care distribution, however, the obligation to provide health care needs firmer grounding in a philosophy of medicine and of society. In a theory built on prima facie principles, social beneficence could be overridden for good reason by other principles like autonomy or a competing theory of justice like Engelhardt’s or Nozick’s. A firmer justification can be found in the origins of a moral claim in the phenomena of illness and healing and in the notion of health care as common good. Together these realities would establish health care as a moral obligation a good society owes to all its members.¶ This is because health, or at least freedom from acute or chronic pain, disability, or disease, is a condition of human flourishing. Human beings cannot attain their fullest potential without some significant measure of health. A good society is one in which each citizen is enabled to flourish, grow, and develop as a human being. A society becomes good if it provides those goods which are most closely linked to being human. Health care is surely one of the first of these goods. It is, to be sure, not the only human good (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1178b30–34). But other goods, like happiness, wealth, friends, career, etc., are compromised or even impossible without health.¶ In addition to the claim that arises out of the obligation of a good society to enhance the flourishing of its members, there is the non-proprietary, non-commodity character of medical knowledge alluded to in sections I and II above. The nature of medical knowledge and the way in which it is acquired and transmitted to health professionals make it a collective good on which the members of a society have a substantive claim. Human beings across national boundaries also contribute to the body of knowledge required in health care today. With varying degrees of strength, all humans are linked in a world community which shares in the fruits of medical research.¶ Health care is both an individual and a social good. A good and wellfunctioning human society requires healthy members, and healthy members require a good and well-functioning society. This reciprocity of de-pendence between individual and societal good implies a reciprocity of obligations as well. Aquinas puts the relationship between the individual and common good in this way:¶ He who pursues the common good thereby pursues his own good for two reasons. First, because the proper good of the individual cannot exist without the common good of the family or state or realm.... Second, since a person is a part of a household or state, he ought to esteem that good for him which provides for the benefit of the community (Aquinas, ST 2a2ae,q.10,2).¶ Any linkage of a social obligation to provide health care as a human good must engage the question of reciprocal responsibility of citizens to care for their own health. In a common good conception, the self-abuser, the person who refuses to buy insurance he or she can afford, or who refuses to take a genuine part in community life, imposes burdens on his fellow humans. Such persons weaken any claim they might have had to societal resources (Boyle, 1977). Plato warned about hypochondriac or aged members of society whom he believed should not receive care (Heyd, 1995).¶ This is a harsh judgment which a compassionate society could not impose strictly. It implies refusal to treat the self-abuser in the emergency room whose bleeding from esophageal varices are the result of alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver. Such retributive justice could not be consistent with the primary ethical obligation of physicians as healers. Perhaps a practical compromise is to discriminate against products like alcohol, tobacco, high-risk sports, etc. by taxation or higher premiums but not against persons who do not know how or do not care about their health (Evans, 1988). After all, where does one draw the line on irresponsibility? How much exercise, weight-, or stress-reduction is enough to qualify for participation in the societal good? Who has pursued health so sedulously as to be free of lapses for which he is responsible? Where do we draw the bright line?¶ The role of government here is not forcefully to redistribute wealth in general or to bring about total equality in all things but to assure that collective goods, or the satisfaction of a common claim on such goods, are justly distributed. This approach does not translate into an unlimited claim on all the health care possible. It is not an invitation to “blank check” medicine. Nor does it mean that health care takes priority at all times and in all places over all other societal goods. Nor does it swallow private property rights in central planning. It does mean that there is a moral obligation of a good society to relieve the sufferings of its citizens, to provide what is needed for the fabric of society to hold together, and to see that the collective interest of society’s members in health care is assured. This is, in effect, beneficent justice — justice ordered by the obligation to rescue, sustain, and nourish both society and the individual since each suffers if either is neglected or abused. This is a positive obligation that transcends the more negative or legalistic notion of “rights,” but it is not an absolute obligation overriding all other obligations.¶ Treating health care as a common good implies a notion of the solidarity of humanity, i.e., the linkage of humans to each other as social beings. The common good is, however, more than economic good — necessary though this may be in an instrumental sense (Bellah, 1991; Glendon, 1991). It also implies the development of social and governmental institutions designed to promote justice and the well-being of the whole society in essential things like health, safety, environment, and education.¶ Nowhere does this conception militate against the protection of individual rights. It stands against the absolutization of the Marxian collective as well as the absolutization of Nozickian property rights. Rather, the morally defensible aim is a mixed economy: one in which private property and private enterprise are protected, but there is enough social control to assure justice, especially in those things that cannot be left to the fortuitous operations of the competitive marketplace (Ryan, 1916). These things must always be few and of such nature that a healthy and well-functioning society could not exist without them.¶ It is especially important to recognize that rejection of a marketplace ethics for the distribution of health care does not make the market an unethical instrument for the distribution of most other goods and services. As Worland has shown, Adam Smith himself recognized that the market was not the preferred device for providing certain public goods like defense, education, or a transportation infrastructure or for setting rates of interest, etc. (Worland, 1983, pp. 8–9). Smith had no difficulty reconciling liberty, private property, and government intervention when the rights of a few threatened to endanger the whole. In both The Wealth of Nations (1909) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1817), Smith saw a specific role for moral restraint on self-interest and of government’s responsibility to prevent monopoly and to administer justice (Worland, 1983, p. 21).¶ In this view, the role of the government is both to protect personal liberty and attend to those common goods that liberty destroys when it becomes license. How this balance is to be achieved is a constant struggle of democratic societies and institutions. What is crucial in health care is that any policy must take cognizance of the common social good, the shared moral claim on medical knowledge, and the special nature of health care as a human activity.¶ What is equally crucial is that the physician remain truly a physician, concerned with healing and not money-making (Plato, Republic 342c and 342d). In any plan in the future, the physician ought not be the gatekeeper, microallocator, or rationer. Nor should she or he become provider, insurer, or risk-taker simultaneously (O’Reilly, 1998; Witten, 1997; Wang, 1996). The current move to establish the physician-provider organizations in which employers, hospitals, and corporations “buy” health care from groups of doctors are just as dubious morally as other capitated insurance plans. In addition, they deprive patients of their last advocate since the physician is the healer, the risk-taker, and the profit-maker simultaneously (Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 1995). The assumption that physicians as administrators are more likely to represent patient interests if they own or administer the system is dubious at best. If earlier studies of higher prices and overutilization of doctor-owned radiology and laboratory facilities are accurate, this assumption is likely to be a dangerous myth.¶ This is not the place to design a total system of health care, nor to fill in the content of precisely what services constitute a fair share of the common good of health care, nor to speak of the costs, modes of payment, and choices among other societal goods. Obviously, those are the questions most often at issue in policy debates. But, in the end, those are secondorder questions. They can be answered properly only in light of the firstorder questions: What is health care? What kind of good is it? What moral claim do members of a society have on this good? What are society’s obligations, and what are the obligations of the health professional with reference to that good?¶ Understanding health care to be a commodity takes one down one arm of a bifurcating pathway to the ethic of the marketplace and instrumental resolution of injustices. Taking health care as a human good takes us down a divergent pathway to the resolution of injustice through a moral ordering of societal and individual priorities.¶ One thing is certain: if health care is a commodity, it is for sale, and the physician is, indeed, a money-maker; if it is a human good, it cannot be for sale and the physician is a healer. Plato’s question admits of only one ethically defensible answer.¶ Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician, insofar as he is a physician, seek to enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient?

#### Turns AMR: Big Pharma causes AMR.

McElrath ’16 (KJ McElrath – Master’s Degree @ Central Washington University, Freelance Writer, , “Antibiotic Resistant “Superbugs”: is Big Pharma Responsible?” 22 September 2016, https://drugsafetynews.com/2016/09/22/antibiotic-resistant-superbugs-big-pharma-responsible/)

A shocking publication from the European Public Health Alliance in collaboration with the UK organization Changing Markets came out this week reporting that Big Pharma is directly responsible for the recent rise of “superbugs;” bacteria that are resistant to most antibiotics.

This has been a growing problem for the past several decades. Most often it has been attributed to the overuse of antibiotics and sterilizing agents such as hand sanitizers. However, this report, entitled “Drug Resistance Through The Back Door,” identifies the real culprit as contaminants released into the environment by large drug companies like Pfizer, Mylan, Teva and others. Most of this comes from their facilities in China and India, where most of the world’s antibiotics are manufactured.

Because there are few environmental regulations in those countries, these drug makers are allowed to dump their waste products into rivers, lakes and streams. According to the report, this is what has been creating antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Antibiotic waste comes into contact with naturally-occurring bacteria that live in the water, which then adapt to their new conditions – making antibiotic medications less and less effective.

The implications for human health are grave (literally). According to the Centers for Disease Control, two million people in the US contract antibiotic-resistant bacteria each year – and for 23,000 of them, the result is fatal. Within the next 35 years, the annual death rate around the world is expected to reach 10 million, with economic losses reaching as high as $100 trillion. Medical researchers now fear that within a few years, even relatively minor surgeries could become high-risk procedures, and common illnesses such as colds could prove fatal.

Last year, the government of the UK put out its own report on AMR. That publication recognized pharmaceutical waste in the environment as “a supply chain problem that pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers need to solve together.” Good luck on that; as Big Pharma has demonstrated again and again they don’t give a tinker’s damn about anything but maximizing their profits, regardless of the consequences to human health.

#### Turns disease terminal: Growth makes catastrophic outbreaks inevitable AND they only cause extinction under globalization.

Morand & Walther ‘4/20 (\*Serge Morand; PhD, disease ecologist @ Kasetsart University; \*\*Bruno A. Walther; DPhil, Taipei Medical University; 4/20/20; “The accelerated infectious disease risk in the Anthropocene: more outbreaks and wider global spread”; pg. 3-4; Accessible at: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.20.049866>) \*”to” added to preserve grammatical integrity, brackets denote a change

We here want to draw attention to another important and noteworthy feature of the Anthropocene which greatly affects public health, human well-being, and economic performance. These findings are especially pertinent as the world reels from the health, social and economic impact of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (El Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020; Ghebreyesus and Swaminathan, 2020; Lorusso et al., 2020). The increasing connectivity of human populations due to international trade and travel (Guimerà et al., 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Brockmann and Helbing, 2013; Gabrielli et al., 2019), the rapid growth of the transport of wild and domesticated animals worldwide (Rosen and Smith, 2010; Schneider, 2012; Rohr et al., 2019; Levitt, 2020), and other factors such as the increasing encroachment of human populations on hitherto isolated wild animal populations through loss and fragmentation of wild habitats (Patz et al., 2004; Despommier et al., 2006; Pongsiri et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2013) have led to a great acceleration of infectious disease risks, e.g., the increase in emerging infectious diseases and drug-resistant microbes since 1940 (Jones et al., 2008) and the increase in the number of disease outbreaks since 1980 (Smith et al., 2014). To expand the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014) to the beginning of the Anthropocene, we investigated whether the number of disease outbreaks has increased since the Second World War. In addition, we examined whether the global pattern of infectious disease outbreaks changed possibly due [to] the increasing connectivity of human populations. In other words, have the disease outbreaks become more globalized in the sense that these outbreaks are increasingly shared by countries worldwide? To investigate these questions, we used a the most complete, reliable, and up-to-date global dataset (GIDEON Informatics, 2020) which had already been used in the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014). This dataset can be used to enumerated the recorded annual number of disease outbreaks. To investigate the changing global patterns of disease outbreaks, we used this dataset to calculate two measures which have been recently introduced into ecological and parasitological studies. These two measures, namely modularity and centrality, quantify the connectivity of bipartite networks. Modularity is defined as the extent to which nodes (specifically, sites and species for presenceabsence matrices) in a compartment are more likely to be connected to each other than to other nodes of the network (Thébault, 2013). The calculation of a modularity measure is useful for global phenomena because it allows the overall level of compartmentalization (or fragmentation) into compartments (or clusters, modules, subgroups, or subsets) of an entire dataset to be quantified. High modularity in a global network means that subgroups of countries and disease outbreaks interact more strongly among themselves (that is, within a compartment) than with the other subgroups (that is, among compartments) (Bordes et al., 2015). Centrality is defined as the degree of the connectedness of a node (e.g., a keystone species in ecological studies; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010). In the context of our study, centrality is the degree of the connectedness of a country and those countries connected to it. We estimated the countries which are the potential centres of disease outbreaks by investigating the eigenvector centrality of a given country in a network of countries which share disease outbreaks among each other. Eigenvector centrality is a generalization of degree centrality, which is the number of connections a country has to other countries in terms of sharing disease outbreaks. Eigenvector centrality considers countries to be highly central if the connected countries to them through shared outbreaks are connected to many other well-connected countries (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001; Wells et al., 2020). Modularity and centrality analyses have been used to investigate various ecological, parasitological and epidemiological questions (e.g., Tylianakis et al., 2007; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010; Anderson and Sukhdeo, 2011; Bascompte and Jordano, 2014; Poisot et al., 2014; Bordes et al., 2015; Genrich et al., 2017). Using a widely used world dataset on infectious disease outbreaks, we here present results which demonstrate that the accelerated number of disease outbreaks and their increased global spread are two further threatening aspects of the accelerated infectious disease risk associated with the globalization process which characterizes the Anthropocene.

#### Turns China war: Inter-capitalist competition makes US-China conflict inevitable

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Belt and Road At the same time, Xi Jinping started the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In many senses, the BRI was an attempt to create an overseas market for state enterprises to export their excess capacity. The BRI was basically to lend money to other developing countries to make them buy Chinese products or hire Chinese companies. For example, the annual reports of China’s leading construction machine companies show that after 2012, they successfully climbed out of their profit crisis, and their revenue growth soared. In those reports, they explicitly thanked Xi Jinping and the BRI, as most of their orders now came from countries involved in the BRI. These Chinese state-owned companies were squeezing out American companies in the Chinese market, and now they were squeezing out American companies in the international market in the developing world. As such, the new competition from Chinese corporations was the impetus behind the American corporations’ shift on China. Even in finance, US banks were facing competition from Chinese state banks, which started to be active in the developing world, while China did not open its financial sector for foreign banks as much as it promised when it joined the WTO. US corporations started to feel hurt by China. This is the underlying material force behind the US-China rivalry. The Trump administration did not begin the rivalry; it only continued it, which started already in the Obama administration. Continuity In 2012, Washington began the “Pivot to Asia” policy, reorienting a large part of US military and diplomatic forces to Asia in response to China’s increasing aggressiveness in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Obama-Clinton also pushed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. The whole purpose of the TPP was to isolate China economically and to put pressure on China to change its economic policy if it wants to join. When Trump got elected, many people in China, including the nationalist tabloids and official scholars, were excited and glad that it was not Hillary Clinton who was going to continue the Pivot to Asia policy and the TPP. They expected that Trump would reset the US-China policy and strike a deal with China that could relieve the US pressure on China. In the end, it was much worse. The underlying structural change in US-China relations remained the same, though the method is different. Obama was using the TPP as a carrot to lure China to change its economic policy for the sake of US corporate interests. Now Trump is using the stick of tariffs. But the goal remains the same. Behind the increasing willingness of the United States to counter China’s economic and geopolitical expansion from the Obama to Trump administration is the same structural condition confronting American corporations. So, what is going to come next? Interestingly, many people think it depends on the next election. But in fact, the election will not change much of the dynamic. If Joe Biden gets elected, he will most likely double down on the Obama-Clinton policy on China, the Pivot to Asia, and the TPP kind of plan. The US-China rivalry will continue to intensify, no matter who wins. The dynamics of US-China rivalry is an inter-imperial rivalry driven by inter-capitalist competition. Competition for the world market could soon turn into intensifying clashes of spheres of influence and even war. It is not new. It resembles a lot of the dynamics as described in Lenin’s Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In the book, published in 1917, Lenin talked about the competition between German and British banks to lend to Latin American countries to build railroads and to ensure the projects would rely on German or British supplies. This is just like talking about the competition between China and the U.S. to offer credits to Belt and Road countries to build infrastructure. In the early twentieth century, inter-capitalist competition led to inter-imperial rivalry culminated in two world wars. What is to be done for progressive forces around the world in this time of inter-imperial rivalry? During the First World War, Lenin led the Bolsheviks to adopt a program of pulling Russia out from the European rivalry at the point of inducing a Russian defeat in the War. In the Second World War, the international communist movement established a united front with the liberal empires to fight the fascists. These are the two different options for the Left amidst escalating inter-imperial conflict that the U.S. and China seem to be heading. Which route we should opt for, to be sure, cannot be answered by abstract theoretical discussion, but has to be tackled by concrete analysis of concrete situations.

#### The alternative solves pandemics better — socialized medicine would provide better access and disease protection than the pharmaceutical industry.

Flowers 17 – MD, Co-director Popular Resistance (Margaret, “How We Win National Improved Medicare for All,” *Health Over Profit,* <http://healthoverprofit.org/2017/01/27/how-we-win-national-improved-medicare-for-all/>) --- NIMA = National Improved Medicare for All

Throughout the more than one hundred years of efforts to secure universal access to health care in the United States, there have been moments of opportunity to advance the issue followed by setbacks. Such an opportunity arose during the health reform process of 2009 – 2010 and was followed by a decline after the national health legislation, the ACA, was passed in March 2010. Social movements are like that, they are like waves shaping the shore. A movement needs to watch for those waves and amplify them. Another wave for NIMA [National Improved Medicare for All] is rising because of the obvious failures of the ACA, persistent grassroots organizing by single payer supporters, and the momentum created by the Bernie Sanders campaign, which activated new people and elevated the public dialogue around single payer. This is the time to look back at the lessons of past efforts and consider what can be done in this political moment. A Watershed Moment for the National Improved Medicare for All Movement Shortly after the election of Barack Obama in 2008, a coalition of organizations that supported NIMA, the Leadership Conference for Guaranteed Health Care (LCGHC), which had been meeting monthly by conference call for the preceding two years, held a face-to-face meeting to strategize ways to include NIMA in the upcoming health care debate. The coalition included health professional organizations, such as Physicians for a National Health Program, labor unions such as National Nurses United, grassroots organizations, many of which were part of Health Care Now, faith-based groups and political organizations such as the Progressive Democrats of America. The conditions seemed ripe to move NIMA forward. In 2003, President Obama told a group in Illinois that we would get single payer when the Democrats had control of the White House, Senate and House. Polls indicated that more than 60% of the general public, almost 60% of physicians and 80% of Democrats supported NIMA. Out of the November strategy session several committees were formed. I was a member of the LCGHC as co-chair of the Maryland chapter of Physicians for a National Health Program, and I joined the lobbying committee. Beginning in December 2008, we met with members of Congress, including leadership, and asked that our proposal for National Improved Medicare for ALL be included. Many members of Congress agreed that this was a reasonable idea. However, as I experienced over the course of the reform process, politicians appear agreeable in order to placate constituents, although they have no intention of following through on what they say. The first series of three hearings on the health reform legislation was held by the Senate Finance Committee in May 2009. Max Baucus (D – MT) was chair and he hired Liz Fowler, a former lobbyist for WellPoint (one of the largest private health insurance companies in the US) to lead the health reform process. Fowler, who was called the most influential health staffer in the Senate by Washington Post health reporter Ezra Klein, authored a white paper for the bill in November 2008 and also authored the Senate health legislation. When we saw that only industry and big business representatives, such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, were invited to testify, we pushed for the committee to invite Dr. Marcia Angell, a national health finance expert and former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. Single payer supporters sent emails and called the committee office, but the day before the second hearing we were told that Dr. Angell would not be invited. That was a watershed moment. All of those months of lobbying to be included had failed. NIMA was being excluded from the process. In response, eight of us decided to attend the hearing and ask why we would not be allowed to testify. We stood up one by one and spoke out during the hearing about the exclusion of what majorities of people in the US wanted and needed and about the corruption of the committee. And one by one, as the C-SPAN cameras rolled, police were ordered to remove us from the hearing and arrest us. This action received significant attention and we became known as the “Baucus Eight”. The following week at the third hearing, National Nurses United and a few more doctors protested and five more people were arrested, the “Baucus Thirteen”. As a result, in June, I was contacted by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) committee and asked to testify in their first hearing. And when hearings were held in the House of Representatives, representatives of the single payer movement were invited to testify. It was a positive step, if only designed to placate NIMA supporters. Through the summer, there was a lot of activity by grassroots activists to push for NIMA locally and in Washington, DC. The LCGHC organized Congressional briefings to educate staffers and in my new role as Congressional Fellow for Physicians for a National Health Program, I organized health professionals and students to meet with health staffers and teach them about NIMA. The process of health reform in the House stalled because of bipartisan disagreement that summer. Major events were held in Washington, DC and nationwide around Medicare’s birthday at the end of July 2009. There was a large march and rally in DC and hundreds of activists delivered informational ‘birthday cards’ and cupcakes to members of Congress. Interestingly, the only amendment that unified the two parties during the entire health reform process was an amendment offered on July 30 by Representative Anthony Weiner calling for Medicare to be dissolved. It was a test by the NIMA movement and both parties opposed dismantling Medicare. Congressman Weiner then offered an amendment to substitute NIMA legislation for the House bill. The committee was under pressure because it was close to the August break, and so leadership made a deal that they would allow the amendment to be offered for a vote on the floor of the House if Weiner withdrew it. He did. The summer break was a crazy time. The right wing fury over the health legislation, funded and whipped into a frenzy by the Koch Brothers-backed group Americans for Prosperity, brought hundreds of protesters out to local Town Halls. They called the health legislation everything that a NIMA system would be called, such as “socialism” and “government-run”, even though the bill was being written by and for the industry and was the opposite of a single payer system. If the Obama administration and Congressional leadership had hoped that avoiding single payer would placate the Right, they were mistaken. In the fall, NIMA activists also escalated to build support for the single payer substitution amendment. A group of doctors from Oregon organized a road trip from Washington State to Washington, DC called the Mad as Hell Doctors tour. They spent the month of September zig- zagging across the country holding 40 events in 17 states. Their tour culminated with a large rally at the White House attended by health professionals from almost every state. Despite numerous requests for a meeting with the President, they were ignored. A few of us from the LGCHC formed an independent group, the Mobilization for Health Care Reform, to have more flexibility to organize direct actions. “The Mobe” held national days of protest at insurance companies calling for Improved Medicare for All. Over 1,000 people pledged to risk arrest and almost 200 doctors, nurses and patients were arrested for sit-ins. One group in Louisville was locked in the lobby of Humana overnight without access to food or bathrooms. In November, just thirty-six hours from the House vote on the health bill, the LCGHC was informed that if the single payer amendment were to be voted upon, then Representative Bart Stupak (D –MI) and Joseph Pitt’s (R – PA) anti-abortion amendment would also have to be voted on. We agreed to withdraw the amendment, though in the end Stupak and Pitts persisted and their amendment went forward and was passed. That was an important lesson – not to be tricked into backing down. Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a similar single payer substitution amendment in the Senate based on his American Health Security Act, and Senators Sherrod Brown (D – OH) and Roland Burris (D – IL) co-sponsored the amendment.The Senate version of the health bill faced significant struggles, and Senators were under tremendous pressure by the Obama Administration and leadership to pass it before the winter break in mid-December. The Sanders’ amendment was initially not allowed to be introduced on the Senate floor. Majority leader Harry Reid (D – NV) skipped over it as other amendments were heard. In protest, on International Human Rights Day, “The Mobe” organized an action in which paper cut-outs that looked like chalk outlines of dead bodies were delivered to Senators with a letter describing the number of people in their state who were dying for lack of access to care. Senator Al Franken (D – MN) chastised us for upsetting his staff. By the time we arrived at Senator Reid’s office, CNN and a Getty photographer, Alex Wong, were following us, and Reid’s Deputy Chief of Staff agreed to speak with us. Perhaps it was the protest and our pleas to Reid’s staffer that pushed the Majority Leader to allow the amendment to be voted on. The action happened on a Thursday and the next Monday word came down that the amendment would proceed. To mark the historic occasion, we held a vigil the night before the amendment was brought to the floor in the atrium of the Senate Hart Building. To make it even more memorable, the late Senator Phil Hart’s daughter contacted us and told us that he was a single payer supporter and he would have approved of our efforts. On Wednesday, December 16, the amendment was introduced on the floor of the Senate. Immediately, Senator Tom Coburn (R – OK), a physician, called for the 767-page amendment to be read. Sen. Sanders objected, but Sen. Coburn held firm and the reading of the amendment began. For three hours, the amendment was read on C-SPAN and single payer supporters across the country tuned in. But tension was high as the winter break neared, and after three hours, Sen. Sanders made a deal with Sen. Reid to withdraw the amendment. In exchange, he was given thirty minutes on the Senate floor to make a speech. Sanders said, “I am absolutely convinced that this legislation or legislation like it will eventually become the law of the land.” Obstacles to National Improved Medicare for All and Lessons Learned Although many people blame the Republicans for the exclusion of NIMA during the health reform process, it was actually the Democrats and progressive organizations that shoulder most of the blame. A tried and true method of weakening a movement is to divide it, and that is what supporters of the ACA did starting in 2008. The model for the ACA was the health law passed in Massachusetts under Governor Mitt Romney in 2006, which was based on a model designed by the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation. Shortly after that, state health reform advocates funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation started pushing the same model in other states. There was a big push in Maryland by Maryland Citizens Health Initiative (MCHI). In July 2008, MCHI, labor and progressive groups launched a new coalition to support the Democrat’s health reform. The coalition was called Health Care for America Now, which was based on the name of the long-time single payer organization Healthcare Now. This is a common tactic – stealing the name or slogan of the opposition and causing confusion around it. Health Care for America Now supported the idea of a public option, a public insurance that they claimed would compete with private insurance and eventually become a single payer plan. From a health policy standpoint, this made no sense because all attempts at this in the past had failed. The private insurance companies attract the healthiest enrollees and the sickest patients wind up in the public insurance, which ultimately fails financially due to the high burden of healthcare costs it carries. But the idea of a public option was successful in fooling many single payer supporters who were told that single payer was not ‘on the table’ and that the public option was their best choice for reform. Tens of millions of dollars were given to Health Care for America Now, and it was used to control progressive groups. Meetings were held every Tuesday in Washington, DC where organizations were given their marching orders and talking points. Groups such as MoveOn, despite high support among their members for single payer, refused to even allow discussion of single payer and rallied people behind the public option. Most progressive members of Congress, even those who campaigned on single payer platforms and supported it in the past, also ran away from NIMA. The Congressional Progressive Caucus, the largest caucus in Congress, tightly controlled their members’ talking points and prevented comparisons from being made between the health bill and a single payer bill. A big problem was that not only would a public option fail, but it was also never intended to be in the final legislation. In March 2009, speaking at the Center for American Progress, Senator Max Baucus stated that the public option was a bargaining chip that would be used to force the private insurance companies to accept regulations. And, the public option did not make it into the final bill. The House bill included a very weak version of the public option, which was tossed during the final negotiations in 2010. The Senate bill did not contain a public option. In December when advocates pressured the Senate to include a public option and they started moving in that direction, the White House and leadership worked behind the scenes to prevent it. In the end, the ACA was so weak and such a boon for the private insurance industry, that its passage was more about saving the President’s legacy and the face of the party than it was about solving the health care crisis. Many Democrats said they would “hold their nose and vote for it.” Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D – OH), one of the last Democrats to hold out in opposition to the ACA and in support of single payer, was taken for a flight on Air Force 1, the President’s plane, and strong-armed into supporting it. This is a common tactic. The three lessons that I took away from that struggle conveniently fall into the acronym “ICU”, which can also stand for Intensive Care Unit. I often say that we have a health care crisis and we need the ICU. The “I” stands for independence. It is critical that social movements remain independent of the agendas of political parties. Social movements should place policy over politics. The “C” stands for clarity. It is very important for social movements to understand policy and recognize whether the solution they are supporting is a real or a false solution. Single payer is a real solution; it will solve the health care crisis, while the public option is a false solution. Social movements must also recognize misinformation. The ACA was called “universal, guaranteed and affordable” but it would not be any of those. And the “U” stands for uncompromising. Social movements are often told to be pragmatic and compromise, but to paraphrase Gandhi, “One cannot compromise on fundamentals because it is all give and no take.” The only way that we will achieve the solutions we require is to hold firm in our demand for them. Accepting the argument that we must be ‘pragmatic’ weakens the movement. Why should we support Improved Medicare for All? Health advocates are often convinced to support incremental reforms rather than calling for a change as large as National Improved Medicare for All. This is common; social movements have always been told they were asking for too much whether it was for the end of slavery or for worker, women’s or civil rights. In reality, creating a national single payer health plan is the smallest incremental step that can be taken to begin to solve the health care crisis. It is the only way to remove the greatest obstacle to health care in the US, the private insurance companies, and achieve the savings required to cover everyone. It is the only way that health care can start to be treated as a public good rather than a commodity for investors to make profits. There will be much more that needs to be done once NIMA is passed to meet the health needs of the tens of millions of people who are without health insurance or who have insurance but still can’t afford the out-of-pocket costs of care. National Improved Medicare for All would create a national health care system that covers every person living in the United States. It would be financed through a progressive tax so that the costs are predictable and are paid up front, rather than at the time health services are used. There would not be any insurance premiums, deductibles or co-pays, so there would not be any financial barriers to care. And medical debt, the leading cause of personal bankruptcies and foreclosures, would cease to exist. There would be a single standard of high quality comprehensive coverage for everyone. A similar system, the Veterans Health Administration, has demonstrated that single payer ends disparities in health outcomes, which are widespread in the US. When people hear about NIMA, often the first thing they say is that we can’t afford it. The reality is that we can’t afford not to do it and we are already spending enough to cover everyone. The US spends the most per capita on health care each year compared to all of the other industrialized countries. The US even spends more in public dollars per capita alone than many countries spend, including countries that have universal high quality coverage and better health outcomes than the US. Numerous studies have shown that a National Improved Medicare for all would be less expensive than the current health system and that it would control health care spending. One of the biggest wastes of health care dollars in the US is on administration, a third of our health care dollars, hundreds of billions each year, is spent on paperwork to determine what policy a patient has, what that policy covers, where a patient can go for care, how much the patient pays, whether they have a deductible or co-payment, etc. This is because there are hundreds of insurance companies with different plans that have different coverage, provider networks and out-of-pocket costs. The cost of this bureaucracy is a burden to people who have health insurance, because it is included in the cost of the premium, and to health professionals and facilities that have to hire staff on their end to interface with insurance administrators. A NIMA system simplifies that bureaucracy tremendously. There is one system with one set of rules. The administrative savings are estimated to be $400 to 700 billion each year. NIMA systems also control costs because they can negotiate with pharmaceutical and medical device companies for fair prices. The US spends more on goods and services than other countries because it doesn’t have a coherent system of pricing. And NIMA systems also control costs by giving hospitals global operating budgets so that, rather than charging patients for each individual item (each bandage or pill, etc), hospitals have a lump sum they are given each month to cover costs. The ACA was sold to the public as a step towards a single payer system, but in fact it took the US healthcare system in the opposite direction, toward greater privatization. Instead of building up our public insurances, Medicare and Medicaid, they are being increasingly privatized through Medicare Advantage Plans and managed care companies. Instead of getting rid of private health insurance companies, the government became a broker for them as people are forced to buy insurance policies. And the insurance companies are given hundreds of billions of dollars each year in subsidies while they continue to pay millions in salaries and bonuses to their executives. Proponents of the ACA said that it would create competition between insurance companies that would drive them to lower the cost of premiums, but that competition has not emerged and instead mergers are occurring. Insurers continue to try to raise premiums each year by as much as 60%. And private insurers have found new ways to skirt regulations. Although they are required to cover everyone regardless of pre-existing conditions, they have, for example, created ultra-narrow networks that exclude major medical centers where people would need to go for care when they have serious conditions. The result under the ACA is that tens of millions of people are without insurance, and the system cannot be tweaked to achieve universal coverage because the cost would be unbearable. Tens of millions of people are also under-insured, they have health insurance but they still can’t afford the care they need. The quality of employer-based insurance plans is being eroded as they become less comprehensive and more like the high-deductible plans sold on the health insurance exchanges. And finally, the ACA is under constant legal attack because it is so complex that it is vulnerable. Now that the Republicans are in power, they are moving rapidly to repeal the ACA. The Democrats are currently working to defend the ACA. Instead of trying to preserve or tweak a broken and failed system, as has been done for decades, it is time to build on what works, Medicare. How do we win? The current political environment has brought National Improved Medicare for All back into the public dialogue. Senator Sanders made it a major part of his campaign platform, which sparked attacks from the Clinton campaign despite polls showing strong support for single payer. A Kaiser Family Foundation poll in December 2015 found that six out of ten people support Medicare for All, including eight out of ten Democrats, six out of ten independents and almost 4 out of ten Republicans. A more recent Pew poll shows that 52% of Republicans earning under $30,000 a year believe the government should guarantee that everybody is covered. Public support for the ACA remains low. According to an April 2016 Pew poll, 54% of people say they disapprove of the ACA, only 44% support it, and more people say that it has had a negative impact on the country and on their families than positive. The Clinton campaign claimed that improved Medicare for All would be too expensive and that it was too difficult to achieve, that the best path was to build on the ACA. When economist Gerald Friedman, who has authored studies of single payer, came to Sanders’ defense, Ken Thorpe, who worked in the Clinton Administration, wrote a widely-publicized analysis claiming that single payer is unaffordable. Thorpe’s analysis made several false assumptions such as low administrative savings, high utilization and no cost savings. In reality, numerous economic studies at the state and national levels, and experience in other countries with single payer health systems, prove that a NIMA system is the most cost effective and is the best system for controlling healthcare costs. It is not possible to build on the ACA to make it a universal and affordable health system. This mandate model of care has never been able to achieve universal coverage. There have been attempts for decades at the state level in the US to tinker around the edges of the current health system, and none of the changes have succeeded because they do not get at the roots of the crisis. The smallest incremental step that we can take to solve the healthcare crisis is to create a National Improved Medicare for All. This allows the cost savings necessary to provide comprehensive and affordable health coverage for everyone. For decades, people have accepted tinkering with them system because they have been told that small changes are the only options on the table. They are told that there isn’t political will to pass a single payer system in Congress. Unlike the reality of the health care crisis, which will remain until we take the necessary steps to end it, the political reality can change if people work together to make it so. As the failures of the ACA set in and it is repealed, popular support for NIMA is rising again. It is up to us to seize this moment and push it forward. The foundation of any movement is education, organization and mobilization. The single payer movement across the nation has laid much of the groundwork. Physicians for a National Health Program has excellent educational materials and more than 20,000 members, many of whom can give talks to community groups and Grand Rounds at medical institutions. There are also grassroots single payer supporter groups such as Heathcare-Now. And National Nurses United, the largest union for nurses, has advocated for Medicare for All for a long time. The keys to winning single payer are to build a broad movement in support of it and to become more assertive in the tactics that are used. The NIMA movement faces the same obstacles as other social movements, the dominating influence of rich and powerful corporations that control the political system. When single issue movements work together strategically, they have the people power to overcome the power of money. That is why we created a new coalition organized by individuals who have been involved in or leading the fight for National Improved Medicare for All, including people who committed nonviolent civil resistance. Called “HOPE” for Health Over Profit for Everyone, the group is singularly determined to build a broad-based and assertive movement in support of National Improved Medicare for All to shift the political winds and make NIMA the only viable solution. Health care is a uniting issue because it impacts all of us; we all need it at some time in our life and we all have either had a personal experience or know people who have been mistreated by the current system. And health is connected to everything; even if everyone had access to care, health outcomes would not significantly improve unless we address the social determinants of health such as wealth inequality, lack of education, homelessness, unemployment and low wages, food insecurity, systemic racism, mass incarceration, environmental toxins, and the climate crisis. The movement for NIMA needs to frame itself as part of the broader struggle for economic, racial and environmental justice and build relationships with other movements. This is already happening on some fronts. All Unions for Single Payer and the Labor Campaign for Single Payer have worked for a long time to connect single payer to labor struggles. Medical students are taking action in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement and environmental justice groups. As we learned in 2009, escalating the tactics to include protests and other forms of strategic nonviolent direct action will be necessary to advance NIMA. Similar to environmental and climate justice activists who have confronted giant oil and gas corporations to stop harmful projects, and have won in some cases, the NIMA movement will need to confront the medical industrial corporations that prop up the current system. And similar to activists who successfully stopped the Trans-Pacific Partnership, activists will need to pressure individual lawmakers to counter the pressure coming from corporate lobbyists. Building an effective movement for National Improved Medicare for All means understanding the realities of the challenges we face. The political system is rigged to benefit the wealthy and the medical industries have a lot of resources. The current political system will not put NIMA ‘on the table’ unless a popular movement forces it there. And when it is ‘on the table’, the people will have to fight to advance it. The good news is that the truth is on our side and social movements have succeeded in the past to win major victories. Moving forward from the popular uprisings that are taking place across the country right now around a number of issues such as systemic racism and police violence, growing poverty and employment insecurity, mass deportations, rigged trade agreements and war, the time has come for people to work together to set the political agenda from here on. We will not win the changes we need without a broad and activated movement that defines and demands the future we want, including National Improved Medicare for All. Such a movement will be greater and have more of a lasting impact than the current Trump administration.

#### “No alternative” is an elite fallacy — the pandemic provides a unique opening to challenge capitalism and unify globally.

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The deep decarbonisation and degrowth required for such contraction would clearly require significant shifts in the ways our economies are structured, including exploring innovative new ways to govern access to land and housing, and having difficult but compassionate conversations about things such as redistribution and population growth. And, if the response to COVID-19 shows us anything, it is that governments can mobilise extraordinary amounts of money when there is political will. This is good news for funding a transition to renewable energy, if we can develop the political will. A degrowth transition would also mean a cultural recognition that high-consumption lifestyles are unsustainable and that only lifestyles of material sufficiency, moderation and frugality are consistent with social and ecological justice. This challenges us to reimagine the good life beyond consumer culture, thereby sowing the seeds of a politics and economics of sufficiency. Social movements will be needed to help create the support for these structural and cultural shifts. These might include post-consumerist movements that are prefiguring degrowth cultures of consumption by embracing material simplicity as a path to freedom, meaning and reduced ecological burdens; community-led resistance and renewal movements; transgressive and creative forms of the sharing economy as means of thriving even in a contracting biophysical economy; and other social movements and strategies that are seeking to develop new (or renewed) informal economies ‘beyond the market’. So, while the pandemic continues to unfold, as a society we need to consider whether our ambitions are merely to return to business as usual. Alternatively, shaken awake by this disruption, do we aspire to a radical and final break from neoliberal globalisation and aim to transition to a social form that prioritises human well-being and ecology over material accumulation? What now for degrowth? A cautionary tale There is no reason to believe that the current season of forced degrowth represents a permanent and final dislocation of the growth-machine ambitions of neoliberalism. The relatively recent experience of the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its aftermath is a worrying precedent. There was much joyous banging of cymbals and song from progressive interests as Keynesian desiderata were rediscovered and reapplied, especially and successfully by the Rudd government in Australia. The revealed downside of this reinstatement of ‘progress’ was a failure to grasp that Keynes’ theories predated political ecology and were intended to rescue, not transform, industrial capitalism. Hence, the way out of the GFC was a massive re-stimulation of consumption and all the ecological destruction that goes with it. After a major dip, carbon emissions were quickly restored and, after some mild disturbance, the planet was set back on its path to climate destruction. The shadow of Keynes lay heavy on the re-firing smokestack economies of the world. We fear this replay for the current crisis, our anxieties deepened by the observation earlier that neoliberalism is a particularly historically insentient beast. The forces willing snap back are immense and omnipresent throughout the Global North. It’s easy to highlight, not to say pillory, the ‘let’s reopen for business’ cant of President Trump, but, as Streeck reminds us, the European Union is a deeply neoliberal institution, essentially a free-trade bloc, that is equally committed in the current historical moment to the earliest possible resumption of the growth machine. The centre-left and green parties typically operate within the same growth paradigm, too often committed to little more than a limp ‘third way’ that talks of ‘greening capitalism’ or giving it a human face. But that is merely going down the wrong road more slowly. But caution is advised. The cloak of pessimism is too often the disguise of determinism, a tendency that we reject as bad science and politics. Both defeats and victories are snatched from the jaws of historical crises and it’s far too early now to say what will come from the current degrowth moment which we, with the support of Scott Morrison, can type as lockdown. We write, in April 2020, in the steaming mists of the volcanic eruption of the economy and of everyday life. New (or are some old?) social shadows and shapes are discernible: people (often harshly) freed from the neoliberal work frame and finding their way under a closely scripted regime of movement—and, critically, of consumption—laid down by a newly assertive state. A dialectical play of possibilities is evident, and they are certainly too many to try to list now. But we cannot fail to see on the one progressive hand the radical reassertion of the state and of its care infrastructure, as well as the freeing of households from the treadmill of the neoliberal work order (and all the fractured and gendered coping reflexes that went with it). Equally, we discern and recoil from the authoritarian possibilities unleashed by new state arrogation, especially in Anglophone nations, where populist conservatives reign. Who knows what will emerge from this historical clash of possibilities? Our bleakest vision is the emergence of authoritarian states that will ‘lockdown the snap back’—that is, reanimate the Earth-eating monster and drive us harder and faster to the graveside of capitalism. On better days, we hope-think for transition, however messy it might be, to a different social order that finally accepts new ideas of growth and progress. And what mature human being doesn’t desire a life marked by growth and self-realisation, a promise-idea seeded most wondrously by the Enlightenment? The simple point of degrowth, and of most radical thought traditions under capitalism, is that this journey mustn’t consume the social and ecological substrates that sustain us. Will crisis play a consciousness-raising role? It may be that ever-deepening crisis in the existing system of capitalism is the most likely spark for a paradigm shift in both the political economy of growth and its cultural underpinnings. To say this, however, is not to romanticise crisis like dreamy-eyed optimists. In fact, our view of change is based on a deep pessimism about the prospects of smoother and less disruptive modes of societal transformation. As the pandemic deepens or exacerbates the range of pre-existing crises, it seems that our collective task now is to ensure that these destabilised conditions are used to advance progressive humanitarian and ecological ends, rather than exploited to further entrench the austerity politics of neoliberalism. How to ground this great and terrible opportunity in everyday life? For those who recognise the potential in this moment to think and act differently, our basic function is to keep hopes of a radically different and more humane form of society alive. The encounter with crisis can play an essential consciousness-raising role, if it triggers a desire for and motivation towards learning about the structural underpinnings of the calamity itself. We believe that social movements should be preparing themselves to play that educational role, and in fact it is heartening to see this already unfolding in the many inspiring social responses to this tragic time. Among many examples of this, we highlight but one: David Holmgren and the permaculture movement, who are mobilising as we write for the creative renewal of our cities and suburbs. Holmgren’s relaunch of his brilliant RetroSuburbia: The Downshifter’s Guide to a Resilient Future during the pandemic exemplifies this vision and faith in grassroots activity. And, importantly, under its warm messaging about restoration of natural ecology and human values lies a serious prosecution of accumulative capitalism. In the midst of this pandemic, our challenge is to come together and set sail for newer, safer shores and resist the sirens of destruction that would woo us back to the sinking Atlantis of capitalism. This is not a time of species affirmation; it is the hour of gravest peril. It is also a reopening of human possibility. To liberate human prospect, we must cast down, not defend, the burning bridges of a dying capitalist order and be brave enough to entertain the possibility of a permanent and planned economics beyond growth. This pandemic is an ambivalent invitation, even an incitement, to humanity to confront this turning point in the human story with all the creativity, wisdom and compassion we can muster.

#### “Elites will crush the movement” accepts failure before trying — multiple examples prove global movements are possible and coming now.

Tavan '21 [Luca; 3/7/21; writer for Red Flag; "Worldwide revolution is possible and necessary," <https://redflag.org.au/article/worldwide-revolution-possible-and-necessary/>]

In 2011, a poor Tunisian street vendor set himself alight to protest against police harassment. Within days, his act had inspired anti-government protests across the country. Within weeks, the protests escalated into a regional revolt that challenged regimes across the Arab world. One small act tapped into resentment against inequality, unemployment and state violence that engulfed an entire region. The radical wave spread even further: at a massive demonstration against an anti-union bill in the US city of Madison, Wisconsin, a man held up a poster with a picture of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak beside Republican Governor Scott Walker. The caption read: “One dictator down. One to go”. The Arab revolutions went on to inspire the Occupy movement, which spread to more than 80 countries.

Today, more than ever, insurgent social movements and working-class uprisings are spurring action in other parts of the world—from Hong Kong to Chile, from Lebanon to France. One placard at a memorial for protesters murdered while resisting the military coup in Myanmar took up Marx’s incitement: “Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains”.

While the Russian Revolution is cynically held up by capitalist ideologists as the ultimate argument against international revolution, it actually proves the opposite. It shows that the goal is not only necessary, but also that it’s possible. The news of workers seizing power in Russia, overthrowing their capitalist government and declaring their withdrawal from WWI, created shock waves across the planet. Workers in Germany rose in revolt a year later, ending the war for good and building soviets, a form of radical working-class democracy inspired by the Russian example. This was followed by uprisings in France, Italy and Hungary.

The revolutionary wave spread further. A classified British government report from 1919 noted a “very widespread feeling among workers that thrones have become anachronisms, and that the Soviet may be the best form of Government for a democracy”.

The rising tide of radicalism had an impact in Australia too. Meatworkers in the Queensland city of Townsville donned red jumpers, stormed the local police station to free jailed unionists, and placed the city under workers’ control. The editor of the conservative Townsville Daily Bulletin lamented: “Townsville for the last year or so has been developing Bolshevism ... the mob management of affairs in this city, differs very little, from the Petrograd and Moscow brand”.

The Russian Bolsheviks, the revolutionary working-class party that led the revolution to victory in 1917, didn’t just passively wait for revolutions elsewhere. They actively organised to spread the revolt. In 1919, they established the Communist International, an organisation for debate, discussion and coordination between different revolutionary workers’ parties. Revolutionaries in Russia, Italy, France, Germany, the US, Australia and elsewhere attempted to clarify and develop a strategy for overthrowing capitalism everywhere. In none of these countries was there a party like the Bolsheviks, steeled in years of organising working-class struggle to overthrow the state, and capable of leading a revolution. But for a number of years, workers came close to overthrowing capitalism in several countries.

In periods of stability, when social conservatism dominates, international revolution can seem like a pipe dream. Defenders of the status quo actively work to reinforce this illusion. But history proves that the crises that the system generates are international, and that they will inevitably provoke international resistance.

Capitalism is a global system. It requires a global movement to tear it up, root and branch. But it also makes global revolution more possible, and more likely. The most important thing that socialists can do, whether you live in Hong Kong or France, Myanmar or Australia, is to get stuck into organising for it today.

#### Capitalism causes endless warfare and imperial violence.

Robinson, 20 is Professor of Sociology, University of California at Santa Barbara. (WILLIAM I. ROBINSON “Militarised accumulation: the global war economy” accessed online 9/16/2021 <https://arena.org.au/global-capitalist-crisis-deadlier-than-coronavirus-part-ii/>)

Militarised accumulation: the global war economy Beyond financial speculation, debt-driven growth, and pillaging state finances, the transnational capitalist class (TCC) turned to another mechanism to sustain accumulation in the face of stagnation, what I have termed militarised accumulation. Savage global inequalities are politically explosive and to the extent that the system is simply unable to reverse them or to incorporate surplus humanity it turns to ever more violent forms of containment to manage immiserated populations. As popular discontent has spread in recent years, the dominant groups have imposed systems of mass social control, repression and warfare—from mass incarceration to deadly new modalities of policing and omnipresent systems of state and private surveillance—to contain the actual and the potential rebellion of the global working class and surplus humanity. Militarised accumulation refers to how the global economy is becoming ever more dependent on the development and deployment of systems of warfare, social control and repression, apart from political considerations, simply as a means of making profit and continuing to accumulate capital in the face of stagnation. As the crisis intensifies, militarised accumulation may take over as prime driver of the global economy. The so-called wars on drugs and terrorism, the undeclared wars on immigrants, refugees and gangs (and poor, dark-skinned and working-class youth more generally), the construction of border walls, immigration detention centres, prison-industrial complexes and systems of mass surveillance, and the spread of private security-guard and mercenary companies have all become major sources of profit-making and they will become more important to the system as economic depression sets in. The events of September 11, 2001, marked the start of an era of permanent global war in which logistics, warfare, intelligence, repression, surveillance and even military personnel are more and more the privatised domain of transnational capital. Criminalisation of surplus humanity activates state-sanctioned repression, opening up new profit-making opportunities for the TCC. The Pentagon budget increased 91 per cent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, while worldwide, total defence outlays grew by 50 per cent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to $2.03 trillion, some 3 per cent of gross world product, although this figure does not take into account hundreds of billions of dollars in ‘homeland security’ spending. In the decade from 2001 to 2011 military-industry profits nearly quadrupled. Led by the United States as the predominant world power, military expansion in different countries has taken place through parallel, and often conflictive, processes, yet all show the same relationship between state militarisation and global capital accumulation. But militarised accumulation involves vastly more than activities generated by state military budgets. There are immense sums involved in state spending and private corporate accumulation through militarisation and other forms of generating profit through repressive social control that do not involve militarisation per se. The various wars, conflicts, and campaigns of social control and repression around the world involve the fusion of private accumulation with state militarisation. In this relationship, the state facilitates the expansion of opportunities for private capital to accumulate through militarisation, such as by facilitating global weapons sales by military-industrial-security firms, the amounts of which have reached unprecedented levels. Global weapons sales by the top 100 weapons manufacturers and military service companies increased by 38 per cent between 2002 and 2016. Private military and security firms have proliferated worldwide and their deployment is not limited to the major conflict zones in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. In his study Corporate Warriors, P. W. Singer documents how private military forces (PMFs) have come to play an ever more central role in military conflicts and wars. Beyond the many based in the United States, PMFs come from numerous countries around the world, including Russia, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico, India, the EU countries and Israel. PMF clients include states, corporations, landowners, non-governmental organisations, and even the Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. By 2018, private military companies employed some 15 million people around the world, deploying forces to guard corporate property, provide personal security for TCC executives and their families, collect data, conduct police, paramilitary, counterinsurgency and surveillance operations, carry out mass crowd control and repression of protesters, manage prisons, run private detention and interrogation facilities, and participate in outright warfare. In addition, there were an outstanding 20 million private security workers worldwide in 2017, and the industry was expected to be worth over $220 billion by 2020. In half of the world’s countries, private security agents outnumber police officers. Meanwhile, criminalisation of the poor, the racially oppressed, immigrants, refugees and other vulnerable communities activates ‘legitimate’ state repression to enforce the accumulation of capital, whereby the state turns to private capital to carry out the repression of those criminalised. There has been a rapid increase in imprisonment in countries around the world, led by the United States, which has been exporting its own system of mass incarceration. The global prison population grew by 24 per cent from 2000 to 2018. This carceral state opens up enormous opportunities at multiple levels for militarised accumulation. Worldwide there were in the early twenty-first century some 200 privately operated prisons on all continents and many more ‘public–private partnerships’ that involved privatised prison services and other forms of for-profit custodial services such as privatised electronic-monitoring programs. The countries that were developing private prisons ranged from most member states of the EU to Israel, Russia, Thailand, Hong Kong, South Africa, New Zealand, Ecuador, Australia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Brazil and Canada. Every phase in the war on migrants and refugees has become a wellspring of profit-making, from private, for-profit detention centres and the provision of services inside public detention centres such as healthcare, food and phone systems to other ancillary activities of the deportation regime, such as government contracting of private charter flights to ferry deportees back home and the equipping of armies of border agents. In the United States, the border-security industry was set to double in value, from $305 billion in 2011 to some $740 billion in 2023. In Europe, the budget for the EU public–private border-security agency, Frontex, increased a whopping 3688 per cent between 2005 and 2016, while the European border-security market was expected to nearly double, from some $18 billion in 2015 to approximately $34 billion in 2022. When the health emergency comes to an end we may be left with a global economy even more dependent on this militarised accumulation than before the virus hit, and with the threat that the ruling groups will turn to war. Historically, wars have pulled the capitalist system out of crisis and have also served to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy.

#### Mousseau says no China rise impact.

2AC Mousseau, 19—Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (Michael, “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace,” International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, Summer 2019, p.160-196, dml)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers.

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin's Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states' alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states' interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states' behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other's regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### The only scenario for US-China war is containment — link turns the case.

Michael 2AC Mousseau 19, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, “The End of War,” International Security 44:1, 2019, https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2019/07/IS\_End-of-War.pdf

It follows that it is not in the interests of members of the contractualist hegemony to confront China or try to contain it. Such efforts would compel China’s leaders to respond forcefully, which would be in the interest of the hegemonic order: if China’s leaders failed to react to such efforts when they are reported in the domestic media, the pro-market leadership of the Communist Party could be replaced by a Party faction opposed to the global order. Less visible efforts at containment might not trigger such reactions, but China’s leaders have staked the legitimacy of the Party on continued economic success. Therefore, any action that harms China’s economy puts at risk its promarket leadership. What happened in Germany and Japan could happen in China.78

As with the United States’ dealings with axial Britain, contractualist leaders today can seek to cajole China’s leaders to adopt nondiscriminatory practices. Any effort to contain China, however, risks calamity of catastrophic proportions. The implication is as clear as it is profound: contractualist policymakers must not confuse China’s pursuit of a mercantilist advantage with threat of a Thucydides Trap and act on this confusion.79

#### Capitalism unsustainable — financialization and debt bubbles make boom and bust cycles inevitable. That’s Foster.

#### No decoupling — data that accounts for offshoring and rebound effects prove energy efficiency is getting worse. Staying below 1.5° is biophysically impossible under capitalism.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

Unfortunately for the ecomodernists, degrowth scholars and ecological economists have begun to poke holes in their optimistic assessments. Their response can be summarized according to three key counter-arguments: (1) the evidence that ecomodernists provide for relative decoupling is flawed and limited at best; (2) their evidence for the possibility of absolute decoupling is even weaker; and (3) even if absolute decoupling was possible in principle, there is even weaker evidence that this could occur with the necessary speed to stabilize the earth system before reaching irreversible tipping points.

First, claims that rich countries have seen relative or even absolute decoupling of economic growth from domestic material consumption have been shown to focus solely on correlations between national GDP and material throughput while ignoring the material-energetic costs embodied in imported consumer goods. For example, Thomas Wiedmann and colleagues show that while the EU, the US, and Japan have grown economically while stabilizing or even reducing domestic material consumption, a broader analysis of their material footprint embedded in their imports shows that it has kept pace with GDP growth. They conclude that ‘no decoupling has taken place over the past two decades for this group of developed countries’ (Wiedmann et al., 2015, p. 6273). Focusing on the global economy as a whole, Krausmann et al. show that its resource intensity improved over the course of the 20th century, though the early 21st century has seen a faster rate of growing resource consumption than global economic growth (cited in Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Thus, as Kallis and Hickel (Kallis and Hickel, 2019, p. 4; italics added) explain: ‘Global historical trends show relative decoupling but no evidence of absolute decoupling, and twenty-first century trends show not greater efficiency but rather worse efficiency, with re-coupling occurring’.

Second, given the limited evidence for even relative decoupling, it is little surprise that the evidential basis on which claims for the possibility of absolute decoupling rest is even flimsier. In the most comprehensive summary of the modeling evidence to date, Hickel and Kallis (2019) show that even the most optimistic scenarios fail to prove the possibility of absolute decoupling. For example, a modeling study by Schandl et al. (2016) shows that in a ‘high efficiency’ scenario, one that combines a high and rising carbon price plus a doubling in the rate of material efficiency improvement, global resource use grows more slowly (about a quarter the rate of GDP growth) but steadily to reach 95 billion tons in 2050, while global energy use grows from 14,253 million tons of oil equivalent in 2010 to 26, 932 million in 2050. The authors therefore conclude: ‘While some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in ... materials footprint’ (Schandl et al., 2016, p. 8). A high efficiency scenario modeled by the UNEP comes to even less optimistic conclusions (with global resource use rising to 132 billion tons in 2050), since it incorporates the ‘rebound effect’ in which efficiency improvements lead to increased consumption due to resulting price reductions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). In short, as they conclude, these ‘models suggest that absolute decoupling is not feasible on a global scale in the context of continued economic growth’ (Hickel and Kallis, 2019, p. 6).

Third, the critics show that even if absolute decoupling (from both emissions and total environmental impact) were possible in principle, this would need to occur fast enough to prevent transgression of ecological tipping points. Just focusing on the climate problem, the 2018 IPCC report claims that emissions must be reduced 7 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2050 in order to achieve the 1.5 C target, whereas they must reduce 4 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2075 for a shot at the 2 degree target (IPCC, 2018, p. 15). However, even under optimistic assumptions (e.g. a near-term implementation of a high and rising carbon price, alongside heroic carbon intensity improvements), studies suggest that annual declines of 3–4 per cent might be the fastest rate possible assuming continued economic growth (Hickel, 2019). Thus, it would most likely be impossible to meet the 1.5 C target in a context of continuous compound growth. While the 2 degree target might be feasible in this context (assuming implementation of a globally coordinated program starting in 2020), many argue that the IPCC’s estimates downplay the existence of positive feedbacks in the earth system (e.g. Steffen et al., 2018), and thus more rapid emissions cuts might be needed even for 2 degrees. On top of this, economic growth must also be decoupled from impacts on other ‘planetary boundaries’ that may have already been overshot, especially land-use change and biodiversity loss (Raworth, 2017). A number of ecologists believe that to bring humanity back into a ‘safe operating space’, total resource consumption should be reduced from roughly 70 to 50 gigatons per year (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014), while a ‘half earth strategy’ should be implemented that protects 50 per cent of the planet’s surface from direct human interference (up from roughly 18 per cent today) (Wilson, 2017), possibly by 2050 to prevent tipping points in biodiversity loss and land-use change (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Even if these claims are exaggerated, the magnitude of the overall decoupling challenge remains clear. It would mean that total resource consumption and land use needs to shrink, remain stable, or only increase moderately (depending on our assumptions regarding the further stress (if any) that planetary boundaries can handle) even as the total output of the global economy triples by 2060. It is thus not hyperbole to say, as Boris Frankel puts it, that this goal of absolute decoupling is ‘overwhelmingly staggering in its ambition and historical novelty’ (Frankel, 2018, p. 127).

#### Tech fails — doesn’t displace fossil fuels and increased consumption offsets efficiency gains.

Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, *European Environmental Bureau*, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged.

Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it.

First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.”

Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels

. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

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## Case

#### China rise is peaceful---pursuing primacy causes counterbalancing and miscalc.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

It Is Difficult to Stop China’s Continued Rise

Second, neo-primacy’s logic rests on shaky foundations, as the United States’ opportunity to reclaim preeminence is extremely small, and the effort will likely prove both counterproductive and dangerous. Baldly, if the United States was unable to keep China from becoming a near-peer competitor in the first place via classic primacy, it is even less likely that the United States has the wherewithal to put the Chinese genie back in the bottle and now push China from the great power ranks via neo-primacy.

States generally balance when confronted with a direct external threat. This tendency is significant in the US-China context because, under neo-primacy, the United States would effectively declare itself a direct threat to China at a time when US analysts acknowledge China has a growing capacity to oppose American plans and ambitions.53 Though China is not poised to dominate East Asia, it can thus be expected to devote its own considerable resources toward keeping pace with US efforts to arrest China’s rise and/or shift the relative distribution of power in the US favor. The odds of major crises would then increase as Washington and Beijing maneuver for position, in turn raising the odds of escalatory spirals, miscalculation, and war.54

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

And, their own mousseau evidence is defense against advantage 2---says that fear of China rise is false, because they succumb to the existing order

#### Western fear of prolif is a hypocritical colonial logic that perpetuates violence

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Security studies have traditionally been concerned with relations between ‘great powers’, within a hierarchy of stronger and weaker sovereign territorial states (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 329). The field of security politics has largely been ignorant [sic] to and disregarded the security needs and interests of ‘small’ or ‘weak’ states by conceptualising security primarily around the organisation of ‘great power’ politics, underpinned by Eurocentric and racist assumptions (Biswas, forthcoming 2012). “Security studies is by and for Western powers,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 344). There exists a rather limited awareness in international relations (IR) of ‘non-Western’ perspectives on global politics, thus constructing what Ken Booth remarked as IR’s “ethnocentric, masculinised, northern and top-down” formulation (Bilgin 2008, p. 6- 7). Within the international system, “the taken-for-granted historical geographies that underpin security systematically understate and misrepresent the role of what we now call the global South in security relations,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 330). Western constituted social science and humanities have largely ignored the impact of the postcolonial agenda and the Global South and on international norms and practices (Grovogui 2011, p. 178). Agency is presumed to be in the hands of the ‘great powers’ and western political perspectives are constructed as and considered to be the pinnacle of international norms (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 340). This paper seeks to approach the question of nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation from the perspective of those states that see themselves as marginalised by an unequal global security architecture, and demonstrate how the current nuclear nonproliferation regime perpetuates logics of Eurocentric and colonial violence and inequity. Nuclear weapons were introduced to the world over 65 years ago by the United States with the purpose of winning a war against the Axis powers of Japan and Germany (Daadler & Lodal 2008, p. 80). The destructive nature of nuclear weapons presents a tremendous existential threat to the safety and security of the world. In the words of Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the UN General Assembly on 9 June 1988, “Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth,” (Shultz et al. 2007, p. 2). Accordingly, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of nuclear weapons, as the most universally accepted arms control agreement with 189 state members, by recognising five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – the US, Russia, China, France, and Britain (Peterson 2010). In return for the promise by all NWS states to completely disarm, and assistance in the acquisition of civilian nuclear energy technology, all Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) forever forego obtaining nuclear weapons, thereby preventing horizontal proliferation with the stated goal of complete global nuclear disarmament (Gusterson 1999, p. 113). It is significant to note that international institutions such as the UN and the nuclear non-proliferation regime “are largely the product of interstate diplomacy dominated by Western great powers,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 331). The five NWS states also hold the five permanent member seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leading some to criticise the NPT for legitimising and institutionalising nuclear power at the hands of the very few, and at the same time prohibiting the pursuit of nuclear security by the rest of the world (Biswas 2001, p. 486; Biswas, forthcoming 2012). While there have been symbolic reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the NWS states via bilateral and multilateral treaties, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 continues to legitimise the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the NWS/P-5, allowing them to modernise their nuclear arsenals, and engage in vertical nuclear proliferation without interference from the international community (Singh 1998, p. 41). The exclusive nature of the NPT and the alignment of NWS status with the UNSC P-5 is indicative of an international regime that perpetuates logics of colonial violence, oppression, and inequity as represented by the emblematic clash between nuclear “haves” and nuclear “have-nots” (Biswas 2001, p. 486; Peterson 2010). As such, the institutionalised demarcation of NWS and NNWS states has led to accusations of “nuclear apartheid” (Biswas 2001, p. 486; Singh 1998, p. 48). Put simply, “nuclear apartheid” highlights the material inequalities in the distribution of global nuclear resources – “inequities that are written into, institutionalised, and legitimised through some of the major arms-control treaties, creating an elite club of nuclear ‘haves’ with exclusive rights to maintain nuclear arsenals that are to be denied to the vast majority of nuclear ‘have nots’,” (Biswas 2001, p. 486). This is evidenced by the United States having “worked diligently to preserve its nuclear supremacy” since 1945; by attempting to keep the nuclear “secret” in perpetuity, by limiting America’s European allies’ ability to command atomic weapons independently, and endeavouring, unsuccessfully, to keep the Middle East and South Asia free of nuclear weapons (Maddock cited in Rotter 2011, p. 1175). Resistance to Northern domination of the international system is often delegitimised by the West, leading to labels such as ‘rogue states’ or ‘terrorism’. The term ‘rogue state’ is used in political science literature to describe, “a class of states that combines the seeming irrationality and fanaticism of terror groups with the military assets of states,” (Rose 2011, p. 1). ‘Rogue states’ are presumed to lack rationality, presenting a significant and unpredictable danger, as a result of “underlying presumed bad intent of its leadership,” (Smith 2000, p. 119). “The claim to rational decision-making is frequently used by great powers to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. Conversely, the purported lack of rationality on the part of other states, particularly revolutionary regimes like Cuba or Iran, is routinely invoked to explain why they cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 338). This is coupled with the common perception in the West that, “while we can live with the nuclear weapons of the five official nuclear nations for the indefinite future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 112).

**Outweighs nuclear war.**

**Singer ’1** (Clifford Singer; Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Spring 2001; “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?”; *The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security*, 13.1; http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm)

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years.

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more **serious threat to human survival.** The first and most immediate is **biological warfare** combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is [[1]](#footnote-1)achieved.

#### 2---alternative explanations for stability outweigh.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University.. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)